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Research has shown that adults’ lexical-semantic representations are surprisingly malleable. For instance,
the interpretation of ambiguous words (e.g., bark) is influenced by experience such that recently
encountered meanings become more readily available (Rodd et al., 2016, 2013). However, the mecha-
nism underlying this word-meaning priming effect remains unclear, and competing accounts make
different predictions about the extent to which information about word meanings that is gained within one
modality (e.g., speech) is transferred to the other modality (e.g., reading) to aid comprehension. In two
Web-based experiments, ambiguous target words were primed with either written or spoken sentences
that biased their interpretation toward a subordinate meaning, or were unprimed. About 20 min after the
prime exposure, interpretation of these target words was tested by presenting them in either written or
spoken form, using word association (Experiment 1, N 78) and speeded semantic relatedness decisions
(Experiment 2, N  181). Both experiments replicated the auditory unimodal priming effect shown
previously (Rodd et al., 2016, 2013) and revealed significant cross-modal priming: primed meanings
were retrieved more frequently and swiftly across all primed conditions compared with the unprimed
baseline. Furthermore, there were no reliable differences in priming levels between unimodal and
cross-modal prime-test conditions. These results indicate that recent experience with ambiguous word
meanings can bias the reader’s or listener’s later interpretation of these words in a modality-general way.
We identify possible loci of this effect within the context of models of long-term priming and ambiguity
resolution.
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Lexical-semantic ambiguity is the rule rather than the exception:
most words are ambiguous in that they can refer to different
variations on a similar meaning (polysemes) or to completely
different, semantically unrelated concepts (homonyms; Cruse,
1986; Lyons, 1977, 1981). For example, the polysemous word
“run” has a cluster of related word senses such as those used in the
phrases “the athlete/paint/politician/program runs,” whereas the
word “bark” is a homonym with different unrelated meanings, as
in the phrases “the bark of the dog/tree” (Klein & Murphy, 2002;
Klepousniotou, 2002; Rodd, Gaskell, & Marslen-Wilson, 2002).
Skilled language comprehension therefore depends on the
ability to disambiguate the precise meaning of individual words
to build an accurate representation of the intended message.
This is typically accomplished easily and fluently in adult
native speakers, with rapid disambiguation occurring ‘on-the-
fly’ during listening and reading. Although contextual cues are
normally sufficient to indicate which meaning is correct, this
disambiguation process is made easier by biases that promote
preferential access to the most likely meaning (see Vitello &
Rodd, 2015, for a recent review).
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One of the strongest and most important biasing factors is the
overall frequency with which the word is used to refer to each
possible meaning in the language, that is, the relative meaning
dominance. For instance, the word “pen” has one meaning (writing
implement; dominant meaning) that is much more common rela-
tive to another (animal enclosure; subordinate meaning). Numer-
ous studies have shown that interpretation of ambiguous words is
biased toward the meaning that occurs most frequently. This bias
is stronger when there is a greater imbalance in dominance, and it
results in faster, less effortful access for high-frequency meanings
(Vitello & Rodd, 2015). This increased availability of high-
frequency meanings can be revealed most clearly in the absence of
a biasing context, such as in simple word association tasks: par-
ticipants are more likely to retrieve the more frequent meaning of
an ambiguous word (e.g., produce the associate “write” rather than
“pig” in response to “pen”; Twilley, Dixon, Taylor, & Clark,
1994).
Although the effects of immediate sentence context and mean-
ing dominance on lexical-semantic disambiguation are well estab-
lished (Twilley & Dixon, 2000; Vitello & Rodd, 2015), research
suggests that lexical-semantic representations are more flexible
and dynamic than previously thought. Not only are adults highly
skilled at learning new meanings for previously unambiguous
words (Rodd et al., 2013), but they are also able to update their
representations of familiar word meanings based on their current
linguistic experience. Specifically, recent experience with an am-
biguous word in the context of one of its subordinate meanings has
a strong influence on subsequent interpretation of the same word in
the absence of biasing context, an effect referred to as word-
meaning priming (Betts, Gilbert, Cai, Okedara, & Rodd, 2017;
Rodd et al., 2016, 2013; see also Zeelenberg, Pecher, Shiffrin, &
Raaijmakers, 2003 for a related finding). For instance, exposure to
the sentence “The man accepted the post in the accountancy firm.”
results in an increase in the probability of a later word association
response to “post” that relates to the prime-consistent ‘employ-
ment’ meaning, compared with when the word meaning is not
primed. This effect is strongest when the association test occurs
within a few minutes of the presentation of the priming sentence
(Rodd et al., 2016, Experiments 1 and 2), but it then becomes
relatively stable and lasts for at least 20–40 min in lab-based
experiments (Betts et al., 2017; Rodd et al., 2013, Experiment 1)
and up to several hours in real world situations (Rodd et al., 2016,
Experiments 1, 3, and 4).
Word-meaning priming relies critically on the presentation of
the ambiguous word form itself during priming, rather than simply
the semantic content related to the word’s meaning. The latter
effect is semantic priming, which occurs over shorter timescales
but does not produce an equivalent bias in word association
responses after longer delays. Rodd et al. (2013, Experiment 3)
found that replacing the ambiguous word with a synonym in the
priming sentences (e.g., substituting a synonym for “post” as in
“The man accepted the job in the accountancy firm”) produced a
priming effect for job meanings of “post” after a 3 min prime-to-
test delay, but not after a 20-min delay.
Previous studies have examined various possible explanations
for word-meaning priming. For instance, the effect does not appear
to be driven by a detailed exemplar/episodic memory for the
priming sentences, given that there is no priming advantage when
the encounters with the word form are presented using the same
speaker compared with when two clearly different speakers (male
vs. female) are used at prime and test (Rodd et al., 2016, Exper-
iment 1; Rodd et al., 2013, Experiment 2). This finding is incon-
sistent with an account in which perceptual details are retained in
the memory trace of the prime encounter and then matched to the
test encounter, because such an account would predict that a
same-voice test encounter will more strongly cue the memory of
the prime (cf. an episodic lexicon account; Goldinger, 1996; Luce
& Lyons, 1998).
In addition, word-meaning priming does not seem to be a direct
consequence of the explicit recall of the prime sentences at test. If
this were the case then one might expect a substantial number of
word association responses to repeat words from the item’s prime
encounter, but in fact these ‘repeated words’ are relatively rare and
the priming effect remains after these responses are removed
(Rodd et al., 2013, Experiments 1–3). Explicit recall of the priming
sentences might be particularly likely when participants are aware
of the priming manipulation, however previous studies show that
priming effects were not dependent on participant self-reported
awareness (Betts et al., 2017; Rodd et al., 2016). Furthermore, the
salience of the ambiguity in the prime phase has not been shown
to affect the presence or magnitude of the priming effect (Rodd et
al., 2016, 2013).
These studies make clear that recent experience plays a key role
in modulating the availability of word meanings by making low-
frequency meanings more readily available after they have been
recently encountered. This type of priming will facilitate commu-
nication in the likely scenario of word meanings being used
consistently within conversations (Gale, Church, & Yarowsky,
1992). However, the underlying mechanism of word-meaning
priming remains unclear. In the present study, we investigate
which specific aspects of lexical-semantic representations are
changed as a consequence of exposure to an ambiguous word in a
particular meaning context. In what follows, we consider the
possible mechanism(s) of word-meaning priming.
Mechanism of Word-Meaning Priming
Word-meaning priming has two distinctive attributes that set it
apart from other types of linguistic priming and thus constrain
mechanistic explanations. First, it survives relatively long prime-
test delays (at least 40 min; Rodd et al., 2016). By contrast, many
types of linguistic priming can only survive very short prime-test
intervals, ranging from no delay at all to only a few seconds and/or
intervening items (e.g., semantic and form priming, but see
Joordens & Becker, 1997, and Bowers, Damian, & Havelka, 2002,
for possible exceptions). Short-term priming has been attributed to
the influence of multiple, compound cues in short-term memory
(STM) on retrieval from long-term memory (Ratcliff & McKoon,
1988), or residual transient activation of the prime stimulus rep-
resentation within the lexical-semantic network (McClelland &
Rumelhart, 1981; Morton, 1969). However, the compound-cue
account requires the continued activation of all stimuli in STM
between prime and test, which becomes unfeasible when priming
effects are shown for a large number of items and with long
prime-test delays. Similarly, a residual activation account predicts
increased activation for representational units/nodes of all the
stimuli encountered across the prime-test intervals, which would
quickly result in indiscriminate, wide-spread activation across the
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whole network. For these reasons, the causal mechanisms involved
in short- and long-term priming are thought to be distinct; the latter
effect is often considered as a form of implicit learning (Becker,
Moscovitch, Behrmann, & Joordens, 1997).
Longer-term priming effects can be simulated in computational
models through small changes to connection strengths between
lexical-semantic representational layers. In distributed connection-
ist models of word recognition (e.g., Hinton & Shallice, 1991),
word forms and meanings are represented as sparse distributed
patterns of activation, with connections between all word form and
semantic units, as well as recurrent ‘clean up’ connections among
the units within representational layers. When a word is presented
to the network, activation flows from the input (word form) to the
output (semantic representation) until the network settles into a
stable representation (i.e., attractor state). Although persistence in
the intrinsic activations of representational nodes/units can mimic
short-term priming effects, changes to the connection strengths
between them tend to produce smaller but lasting effects that are
more resistant to interference from intervening stimuli (Becker et
al., 1997). One way that these changes can take place is through
error-correcting learning where connection weights are altered
slightly to adjust for the difference between the network’s initial
and target states (Becker et al., 1997; Rodd, Gaskell, & Marslen-
Wilson, 2004). The result is that the network forms an ‘attractor
state’ that makes the target state more likely to occur on the next
encounter with the same input (word form). These alterations in
the connection strengths among active units will affect the net-
work’s response to words that are similar in form or meaning,
while leaving the network’s response to other words unaffected.
A second distinctive feature of word-meaning priming is that it
is not restricted to the same behavioral task at prime and test.
Existing word-meaning priming studies have used semantic relat-
edness decisions to sentence-word pairs (Rodd et al., 2013) or
passive listening (Rodd et al., 2016, Experiments 1 and 2) as the
prime task, and word association as the test task. In addition, Rodd
et al. (2016, Experiments 3 and 4) conducted naturalistic experi-
ments where the prior exposures to ambiguous words and mean-
ings occurred during a routine part of the participants’ lives (e.g.,
rowing-related meanings for individuals who participate in this
sport), and thus there was no experimental priming task. The fact
that word-meaning priming is not task-specific is important for
ruling out a stimulus-response learning account of repetition prim-
ing, which could involve a different learning mechanism (Henson,
Eckstein, Waszak, Frings, & Horner, 2014).
Under the assumption that the word-meaning priming effect is
driven by long-term changes to connections within the lexical-
semantic network, we can consider the specific locus of this effect.
In what follows, we address this question within a distributed
connectionist model of word recognition. We note, however, that
similar distinctions could arise in any model that incorporates
connections with variable weights, including models that use lo-
calist representations (e.g., the interactive two-step model, Dell,
Schwartz, Martin, Saffran, & Gagnon, 1997).
Locus of Word-Meaning Priming
We examine the potential locus of word-meaning priming
within the context of a ‘triangle’ model structure, such as that used
by many models of word reading and spoken word recognition
(e.g., Seidenberg & McClelland, 1989). Many of these triangle
models use the same distributed connectionist structure described
in the previous section, where word forms and meanings are
represented as sparse patterns of binary activation across a large
set of units. The triangle structure results from connections be-
tween orthographic and phonological units (representing the writ-
ten and spoken form of words), as well as connections between
each of these layers and a shared lexical-semantic layer (see Figure
1A).
One particularly relevant implementation of such a model is that
proposed by Rodd, Gaskell, and Marslen-Wilson (2004), which is
capable of learning one-to-many mappings between single word
forms and two meanings. Although Rodd and colleagues focused
exclusively on the orthography-semantics mapping, here we dis-
cuss their proposed mechanism for learning multiple meanings of
ambiguous words as it would occur within the full triangle model
structure. The Rodd et al. (2004) network was trained through
repeated exposures to all form and meaning units set to their target
values [0 or 1], where on each exposure, an error-correcting
algorithm was used to adjust the form-to-meaning connection
weights, as well as the weights of recurrent connections between
semantic units. After the network had been trained on all word-
meaning patterns, a word form input pattern was presented to the
network, with each semantic unit initially being set to [0], but then
becoming activated on the basis of input from the active ortho-
graphic units. For word forms that had been paired with two
meanings during training, the initial semantic activation was usu-
ally some combination of features from the word’s different mean-
ings: a semantic ‘blend state.’ The model’s recurrent connections
in the semantic layer prevented it from settling into these mean-
ingless blend states by biasing the activation of semantic units
toward those that commonly co-occurred with the currently active
units during training (i.e., that were part of a single coherent
meaning) and away from the units that rarely or never co-occurred.
This resulted in stable attractor basins for each separate meaning
pattern (e.g., a dog’s noise, the outer covering of a tree) that made
the blend state unstable.
Within distributed connectionist models such as Rodd et al.
(2004), alterations to connection strengths between units can po-
tentially explain long-term priming effects. Even assuming this,
there are still multiple possible loci of word-meaning priming. One
explanation is that the form-to-meaning mapping is changed as a
result of experience. Indeed, Rodd et al. (2013) suggested this
possibility: “Within this [distributed connectionist] framework,
any recent experience with one of the meanings would strengthen
the connections between its form-based and semantic representa-
tions such that when the model next encounters the word’s form
there is an increased probability of it settling into the recently
encountered meaning” (p. 192, brackets added for clarity). By this
account, the connections between the input form of the word
(orthographic or phonological) and the semantic activation pattern
are strengthened after the priming encounter so that a subsequent
encounter with the same input pattern will be more likely to
reactivate the most recently activated semantic pattern (i.e., the
primed meaning). Others have also suggested that the form-to-
meaning connections can account for similar types of long-term
lexical-semantic priming (Monsell, 1985; Zeelenberg et al., 2003).
A schematic representation of this possibility is shown in the first
column in Figure 1B, with the predicted locus of change in
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response to an auditory (top row) or visual (bottom row) prime
encounter with the ambiguous word.
A second possibility is that word-meaning priming results from
a strengthening of the connections among semantic units (Figure
1B, second column). This is the explanation of long-term semantic
priming proposed by Becker and colleagues (1997). The authors
presented model simulations and empirical results supporting the
view that experience with prime words deepens the attractor basins
for those words in the semantic layer, and that the semantically
similar target words are affected by this change because of their
overlap in semantic space. In conjunction with their original form-
to-meaning hypothesis, Rodd et al. (2016) also proposed this
alternative account of word-meaning priming: “equivalent changes
to the connections within the semantic layer could potentially
make the attractor basin for that meaning more stable, relative to
the alternative unprimed meaning.” (p. 34). In other words, the
units that correspond to the semantic features of the more recently
encountered meaning of an ambiguous word become more
strongly connected to one another, forming a more stable attractor
basin. This change to the attractor structure would make it more
likely that, when the word is encountered again in the absence of
any biasing context, the final settled state of the network would
correspond to the primed meaning.
Critically, these two accounts make different predictions about
whether word-meaning priming will transfer between auditory and
visual modalities. The form-to-meaning connection hypothesis
Prime 
auditory
Prime
visual
1. Form-to-meaning 2. Semanc aractor 
structure
Possible locus of word-meaning priming
3. Form coacvaon + 
form-to-meaning
A
B
S
O P
S
O P
S
O P
S
O P
S
O P
S
O P
Semanc 
layer
Orthographic 
layer
Phonological 
layer
Auditory 
input
Visual 
input
Unaltered 
Connecons between layers Alteraon intensity
Altered Least Greatest 
Figure 1. (A) Schematic representation of a triangle model of word recognition (Harm & Seidenberg, 2004;
Seidenberg & McClelland, 1989). Circles represent distributed patterns of activation. Straight arrows represent
the connections between layers, and circular arrows represent recurrent ‘clean up’ connections that form attractor
states within the layer. (B) Columns show three possible loci of the word-meaning priming effect (see text). Each
column depicts the changes within the system in response to auditory (top row) and visual (bottom row) prime
encounters under each hypothesis.
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predicts that word-meaning priming will depend on the congru-
ence of the word form (spoken or written) between prime and test
encounters, with greater priming effects when the word form is the
same modality. The strongest version of this account predicts that
there will be no cross-modal priming, that is, when the ambiguous
word is presented in different modalities in the prime and test
exposures. The semantic attractor hypothesis, on the other hand,
predicts that priming will impact on comprehension of word mean-
ings regardless of the presentation modalities at prime and test,
making it possible to observe cross-modal priming. Furthermore, if
word-meaning priming is driven entirely by the connections be-
tween units in the semantic layer, then cross-modal priming should
be equivalent to unimodal priming. Previous research on word-
meaning priming (Betts et al., 2017; Rodd et al., 2016, 2013) has
used only the spoken form at both prime and test, so at present
there is no evidence for or against the existence of word-meaning
priming in cross-modal conditions.
Thus far we have described two alternative loci of word-
meaning priming within distributed connectionist models: changes
to the weights of connections that (a) link word forms to meanings
(i.e., between orthographic or phonological units and semantic
units), or (b) form attractor states for meanings within the semantic
layer. There is a third possibility, which is that the prime and/or
test encounters with words in one modality (e.g., orthographic
input in reading) involves the covert activation of the other mo-
dality (e.g., phonological recoding of written words, see third
column in Figure 1B). There is substantial evidence for this type of
word form coactivation from studies of silent reading and spoken
word recognition (e.g., Chéreau, Gaskell, & Dumay, 2007; New-
man & Connolly, 2004; Rastle, McCormick, Bayliss, & Davis,
2011). If this is the case, then it is possible for the form-to-meaning
connections for both the phonological and orthographic represen-
tations to become strengthened as a result of a single encounter
with the ambiguous word. Like the semantic attractor state hy-
pothesis, this form coactivation account allows for the presence of
cross-modal priming.
We note that these three accounts are not mutually exclusive.
Rodd et al. (2016) suggested that changes to recurrent connections
in the semantic layer could occur in conjunction with changes in
the form-to-meaning mappings. Similarly, it may be the case that
priming predominately affects the form-to-meaning connections
within the presented modality, but that coactivation of the other
word form also produces weaker changes to the form-to-meaning
connections in the other modality—this possibility is depicted via
the alteration intensity gradient in the third column of Figure 1B.
Thus there are two important questions regarding the effect of
prime and test modality on word-meaning priming; whether cross-
modal priming can be observed, and if so, whether cross-modal
priming is of equivalent magnitude to unimodal priming.
The prediction that unimodal and cross-modal priming will be
equivalent is not specific to this interpretation within distributed
connectionist models. This prediction could also arise from any
model in which different word meanings are represented by local-
ist, abstract ‘word-meaning nodes’ that are commonly activated by
both auditory and visual input (Jastrzembski, 1981; Kellas, Fer-
raro, & Simpson, 1988). In these cases, word-meaning priming
could result from increased availability of the primed word-
meaning node (e.g., a raised threshold).
It is difficult to predict the effect of prime-test modality con-
gruence on word-meaning priming because there have been rela-
tively few investigations of modality effects in similar paradigms.
Existing evidence suggests that long-term linguistic priming often
involves both a modality-specific and modality-general compo-
nent, but that the relative contribution of each varies across para-
digms (Roediger & Blaxton, 1987; Rueckl & Galantucci, 2005).
Some studies have shown weaker or absent long-term cross-modal
repetition priming, specifically when performance on an auditory
exposure task (e.g., word pleasantness ratings, sentence-word
completion judgments, explicit memorization) and visual test task
(e.g., lexical decision, word fragment/stem completion; McKone
& Murphy, 2000; Monsell, 1985; Roediger & Blaxton, 1987;
Rueckl & Galantucci, 2005) is compared with a visual unimodal
condition.
There is also some evidence for an asymmetric pattern of
modality effects in long-term priming. For instance, Monsell
(1985) reported more cross-modal transfer in repetition priming
from sentence completion judgments to lexical decision in the
visual prime/auditory test condition compared with auditory
prime/visual test. This was assumed to be the result of covert
coactivation of phonological word forms during reading in the
visual prime condition, coupled with little or no coactivation of
orthographic word forms in the auditory prime condition. Al-
though it may seem that the coactivation of phonological repre-
sentations from orthographic forms should also occur during the
visual test phase, resulting in equivalent priming for both cross-
modal conditions, it is possible that orthographic-to-phonological
activation is stronger when the task is unspeeded (as in the sen-
tence completion priming task used by Monsell) or that it is
task-dependent.
Further evidence of this cross-modal asymmetry comes from
Rueckl and Mathew (1999), who showed that priming one hetero-
graphic homophone in a pair (e.g., week) within a disambiguated
context increases the probability of responding with the other,
unprimed word in a visual stem completion test task (e.g., ‘weak’
in response to wea__), where the test stem was always incompat-
ible with the spelling of the primed homophone. This effect oc-
curred regardless of the modality of the primed homophone, sug-
gesting that covert activation of the (shared) phonological word
form occurred during the prime and/or test phases. There was no
significant priming in an orthographic similarity control condition
(e.g., visually presented ‘teak’ as a prime for ‘weak’ in response to
wea__), which suggested relatively little contribution of ortho-
graphic overlap between the homophone pairs in this priming
effect. However, both the stem completion task and the lexical-
decision task used by Monsell (1985) mainly depend on access to
word forms, with relatively little dependence on semantics. The
word-meaning priming tasks, on the other hand, require access to
both word forms and their meanings. Hence, it remains unclear
whether potential asymmetries in phonological/orthographic co-
activation will be relevant to meaning access and selection from
printed and spoken words.
The aim of the present study was to explore the locus of word
meaning priming: does the change that occurs as a result of
exposure to ambiguous word meanings reflect (a) a modality-
specific change in form-to-meaning mappings, or (b) a modality-
general change to lexical-semantic processing. We manipulate the
modality of both the prime and test presentations within the
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word-meaning priming paradigm, using word association (Exper-
iment 1) and speeded semantic relatedness decisions (Experiment
2) to test for preferred interpretations and the speed of meaning
access for ambiguous words. In addition to providing specific
information about the mechanisms of word-meaning priming, the
results of this study will speak to more general issues concerning
how readers/listeners use language experience to aid future com-
prehension. Is information about words and their meanings that is
gained within one modality transferred in full to the other modality
to (potentially) aid comprehension in that form of communication?
Or do we accrue information about how words are used separately
for speech and text?
Experiment 1
In Experiment 1, we used the word association task as a test of
meaning preference, as this allowed for a direct comparison with
previous word-meaning priming experiments (Betts et al., 2017;
Rodd et al., 2016, 2013). Following recent demonstrations that
precise stimuli presentation timing and high quality reaction time
(RT) data can be obtained when testing participants remotely using
Web-based experimental platforms (Barnhoorn, Haasnoot, Bo-
canegra, & van Steenbergen, 2015; Hilbig, 2016; Pinet et al., 2016;
Reimers & Stewart, 2015, 2016), the experiment was conducted
using participants recruited and tested online.
There were two primary phases in the present experiment,
separated by short filler tasks. In the prime phase, ambiguous
words were presented within sentence contexts that supported a
subordinate meaning (e.g., ‘The pig pen was muddier than ever’),
and participants made semantic relatedness decisions to probe words
presented after each sentence to ensure that they were attending to the
sentences and processing their meanings. In the test phase, both
primed and unprimed ambiguous words were presented in isolation,
and for each word, the participant typed an associated word. By
assessing which meaning of the ambiguous word these responses
related to, we can determine how the word was interpreted during
the test phase. Specifically, we were interested in whether the
proportions of word association responses related to the primed
meaning (e.g., associates to ‘pen’ that relate to the animal enclo-
sure meaning) increased following presentation of an earlier prim-
ing sentence relative to when the ambiguous word had not been
presented previously (unprimed). The sentences in the prime phase
and single words in the test phase were presented in either auditory
(spoken) or visual (written) form, and crossing these factors pro-
duced six prime-test conditions: auditory prime-auditory test,
auditory-visual, visual-auditory, visual-visual, unprimed-auditory,
unprimed-visual.
Consistent with previous word-meaning priming experiments
that have used spoken materials at prime and test, we expected
significant priming in the two unimodal conditions. Although the
visual unimodal condition has only been previously examined in
the context of cross-language priming (Poort, Warren, & Rodd,
2016), we have no reason to expect that the magnitude of unimodal
visual priming will differ from that of the auditory unimodal
condition. If word-meaning priming is driven entirely by changes
in form-to-meaning connections (Figure 1B, first column), then we
expect (a) a significant interaction between prime and test modal-
ity such that priming is reduced in the cross-modal compared with
the unimodal conditions, and (b) no significant priming in the
cross-modal conditions (auditory-visual vs. unprimed-visual,
visual-auditory vs. unprimed-auditory). If word-meaning priming
is primarily driven by changes to the semantic attractor structure
(Figure 1B, second column) and/or to the form-to-meaning con-
nections for both phonological and orthographic word forms (Fig-
ure 1B, third column), then we expect no significant difference
between unimodal and cross-modal conditions (i.e., significant
priming in the cross-modal conditions and no significant interac-
tion between prime and test modality). Finally, if word-meaning
priming involves a combination of modality-general and modality-
specific components, then we would expect to see significant
cross-modal priming combined with greater facilitation in uni-
modal conditions.
Method
Participants. Eighty-one participants were recruited via Pro-
lific Academic (Peer, Samat, Brandimarte, & Acquisti, 2015) and
completed the experiment online. Participants indicated that they
were native speakers of British English who were born and cur-
rently residing in the U.K. (verified with IP address geolocation).
We used an a priori inclusion criteria of no less than 2 standard
deviations below the mean percent correct in the semantic relat-
edness and vocabulary tasks, and a session duration of 60 min or
less. This criterion resulted in the exclusion of three participants,
who were replaced during data collection to reach the target of 13
participants per version (see Design). The final sample included 78
volunteers (39 women; M  31 years, SD  11, range  18–56)
who were paid £4.50 for their time. The study was approved by the
UCL Department of Experimental Psychology Ethics Committee.
Design. We used a factorial crossing of three Prime Types
(Auditory, Visual, Unprimed) and two Test Modalities (Auditory,
Visual) which produced 6 Prime-Test conditions: Auditory-
Auditory (AA), Auditory-Visual (AV), Visual-Auditory (VA),
Visual-Visual (VV), Unprimed-Auditory (UA), Unprimed-Visual
(UV). All participants were exposed to a subset of items in each of
the 6 conditions, and all items were presented in all conditions
across different versions of the experiment. This resulted in a
crossed design which combined within-participant, between-item
and within-item, between-participants manipulations. Participants
were assigned to versions in counterbalanced order.
Materials. There were 78 ambiguous experimental items,
which were a subset of the 88 items (words and priming sentences)
used in Rodd et al. (2016) Experiment 2. Because each word was
presented in both spoken and written form, only homonyms were
used, that is, same pronunciation and spelling. This resulted in the
exclusion of 10 items from the original stimuli list that had
different spellings (e.g., night/knight). Meaning dominances were
estimated as the proportions of unprimed word association re-
sponses relating to each meaning, based on a pretest conducted
with a separate group of participants (N  25). For each item, we
selected one of the subordinate meanings (i.e., one that did not
correspond to the highest proportion of the pretest word associa-
tion responses) to be used in the priming sentence. The mean
dominance of the primed meanings for experimental items was
0.23 (SD  0.13, range  0.00–0.48).
The 78 words were arranged in order of dominance and then
pseudorandomly split into 6 lists of 13 words such that all lists
contained words with similar dominance distributions (see Table 1
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in the Appendix). Across the 6 versions, each word list was
assigned to 1 of the 6 experimental conditions (see Table 3 in the
Appendix). The dominance ratings did not differ across the 6 lists,
F(5, 72)  0.01, p  .999.
Each experimental item was presented in a sentence that used
the item in a subordinate meaning context. The ambiguous words
were disambiguated by their prior context to facilitate their com-
prehension, for example, “The musician had altered the song’s key
several times.” Each sentence was paired with a written probe
word, which for half of the sentences was related to the meaning
of the sentence and for the other half of sentences was unrelated
(see Table 4 in the Appendix). The sentences had a mean length of
9.3 words (SD  1.7, min  6, max  13). The mean duration of
the spoken sentences was 2.21 seconds (SD  0.38, min  1.40,
max  2.99).
The sentence and single word audio files used were the same as
those used in Rodd et al. (2016), which were recorded in a
sound-attenuated booth by a female native speaker of southern
British English. All audio files were matched for RMS amplitude.
Procedure. The experimental tasks were presented using an
online survey tool (Qualtrics, www.qualtrics.com) and a JavaScript
engine for collecting RTs (Barnhoorn et al., 2015). After an initial
consent and demographic eligibility screening, participants com-
pleted the following tasks, which are shown in Figure 2 and
explained in more detail below: semantic relatedness prime, vo-
cabulary test, subjective reading/listening questionnaire, Author
Recognition Test (ART), word-association test, meaning clarifica-
tion. The whole session lasted 45 min on average. The vocabulary
test, subjective reading/listening questionnaire and ART resulted
in a delay of 9 min between the end of the prime task and
beginning of the word association task. The mean estimated delay
between the prime and test encounters (i.e., the mean difference
between the midpoints of the two tasks) was 19.5 min.
Demographic questionnaire. Participants were asked to pro-
vide their age, gender, native language, country of birth and
country of residence. The experiment ended at this stage if the
participant did not meet the eligibility criteria.
Semantic relatedness priming task. Participants both heard
(Auditory Prime) and read (Visual Prime) sentences containing an
ambiguous word within the same randomized blocks of trials.
After each sentence, a probe word appeared and the participant
made a semantic relatedness judgment. For instance, the partici-
pant might read/hear the sentence “The pig pen was muddier than
ever” and then read the probe word “ANIMALS.” On Auditory
presentation trials, a fixation cross appeared in the middle of the
screen while the sentence audio played. In the Visual trials, the
sentence was written in the middle of the screen in sentence case
(i.e., with the initial letter of the first word capitalized). After each
sentence, participants moved on to the probe word by pressing the
‘f’ key. Presentation was self-paced to allow participants sufficient
time to ensure that they understood the sentence before moving on
to the probe word (this was particularly important for the Visual
trials due to individual differences in reading speed). However, it
was not possible to end the audio sentence before the entire file
had played, or to move on from the visual sentence within the first
1000 ms of its onset. After the ‘f’ key press there was a 500-ms
fixation cross, followed by the presentation of the probe word (in
UPPER CASE) in the middle of the screen along with reminders
for the response keys (‘j’  related, ‘k’  unrelated) below the
probe word. Participants made a key press to indicate whether or
not the probe word was related to the sentence. This task was
designed to be relatively easy and the probes were never related to
the inappropriate meaning of the ambiguous word.
This task began with a set of 16 practice sentences, all contain-
ing filler ambiguous words. Accuracy feedback was given after
each response to the probe, and a warning message was shown if
the response took longer than 2 seconds. The main task was made
up of 56 sentences containing experimental items in the 4 priming
conditions (AA, AV, VA, VV). The stimuli were separated into
two blocks within the priming and test tasks, and the items were
Figure 2. Experiment 1 order and approximate duration of tasks.
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always presented within the same block for both tasks to reduce
the between-item variance in prime-to-test duration. Roughly half
(6 or 7) of the 13 target words within conditions were assigned to
either block 1 or 2, resulting in similar numbers of trials per
condition in the two blocks. The items within each condition that
were assigned to block 1 or 2 in versions 1, 2, and 3 were assigned
to the opposite block in versions 4, 5, and 6. Within blocks, the
order of trials was uniquely randomized for each participant.
At the end of this task, we assessed participants’ awareness of
the ambiguous words and the priming manipulation. Participants
were asked via open-ended questions whether they (a) noticed
anything in particular about the sentences they just heard or (b) had
any ideas as to what the experiment was about. Participants were
allowed to move on without responding.
Vocabulary test. This task was included so that we could
exclude any participants who were not proficient speakers of
English and who may therefore not have known all the subordinate
meanings of the words in the experiment. The original version of
the Mill-Hill vocabulary test (Raven, Raven, & Court, 1998)
contains 34 target words with 6 words presented as multiple choice
options, and the participant is asked to select the synonym from the
set of 6 options. Three target words and seven incorrect multiple
choice options overlapped with the experimental word set, either in
form or meaning, so these words were removed (targets) or re-
placed with other words matched for length and frequency (incor-
rect options). The final version contained 31 trials.
Subjective reading/listening experience. This task was in-
cluded with the aim of assessing the extent to which any cross-
modal priming might be mediated by reading style (see Results).
Participants responded to 12 statements using a 1–5 scale: 1 
never or almost never, 2  occasionally, 3  sometimes, 4 
usually, 5  always or almost always.
Author recognition test. This task was included with the aim
of assessing the extent to which any cross-modal priming might be
mediated by reading experience (see Results). A modified version
of the ART (Acheson, Wellu, & MacDonald, 2008) was used to
assess the participants’ exposure to print. This test consists of 130
names, 65 of which are real authors and 65 are foils. Participants
tick a box next to any name that they know to belong to a real
author. This test was modified following the recommendations of
Acheson et al. (2008) to include more popular authors, and to
adapt the ART for British participants. Fifteen authors from the
recently updated list (Moore & Gordon, 2015) who were identified
as having the least discriminability were replaced with authors
selected from the 2010–2013 British best-seller lists.
Word-association test. Participants were presented with writ-
ten and spoken single words, and for each word, their task was to
type an associated word into a text box. The instructions provided
some example responses for an unambiguous probe word and
encouraged participants to respond quickly during the task. The
task was split into two blocks, with trials randomized within
blocks. Items were presented in the same block as in the priming
task. The two lists of unprimed experimental items (UA, UV) were
split evenly across the two word association blocks and presented
randomly with the other trials.
In the auditory test conditions, an audio player appeared in the
middle of the screen and the sound played automatically. Partici-
pants were able to replay the word using the audio controls. On
visual trials, the target word appeared in written form in the middle
of the screen.
After this task, we again assessed participants’ awareness of the
priming manipulation. Participants were asked whether they had
any ideas as to what the experiment was about. As with the earlier
awareness questions, this was an open-ended question and partic-
ipants could move on without giving any response.
Meaning clarification. This task was included to facilitate the
coding of word association responses. In each trial, a written
experimental item appeared with the participant’s response, and a
multiple choice question clarified the meaning of the item as it
relates to their response. For example, if a participant entered the
word ‘tree’ in response to the item ‘bark’ in the word association
task, the participant would see: “You heard the word BARK, and
your response was TREE. Which meaning were you referring to?”
The multiple choice options were short definitions related to the
dominant meaning (e.g., dog noise), the subordinate meaning (e.g.,
outer covering of tree), and an ‘other meaning’ option. There was
also a “misheard the word” option for auditory test conditions
only. The order of dominant/subordinate meaning definitions were
randomly allocated to the 1st and 2nd options, whereas ‘other’ and
‘misheard’ were always the 3rd and 4th options, respectively. The
order of trials was randomized for each participant.
Response recoding. The self-coding of responses was checked
by Rebecca A. Gilbert and another researcher, both of whom are
native speakers of English and were blind to condition. The first coder
examined the word association responses and verified that the re-
sponse categorization given in the meaning clarification task (domi-
nant, subordinate, other meaning) was correct. In cases where the
coders could not verify the intended meaning (e.g., ‘train’ in response
to ‘coach,’ which might refer to either meaning), the participant’s
self-coding was always used. Responses where the participant mis-
heard the word or responded with the same word as the target were
coded as a 4th category, ‘invalid.’ The first coder flagged the meaning
clarification responses that were considered to be errors, for example,
if the participant’s word association response seemed to unambigu-
ously relate to one meaning, and where this was not consistent with
the self-coding response. These cases were then examined by the
second coder, and the two coders reached consensus.1
Of the total 5850 word association responses (78 participants 
75 items; see Main Analysis), the codes for 282 responses (4.8%)
were changed from the participants’ self-coded values. Of these
recoded responses, most (84%) were changes from a self-coding of
‘other meaning’ to one of the two definitions, or vice versa. A
minority (14%) were recoded because they clearly related to one
definition but were self-coded as the other definition. The remain-
ing recoded responses (2%) were rare cases in which the partici-
pant reported mishearing the word but the response was clearly
related to one of the definitions, or in which the response was
1 An anonymous reviewer suggested that we use the participants’ self-
coded responses, because of the possibility that our interpretation of their
response was incorrect. For instance, a participant could respond to the
target word BANK with ‘river’ because their local financial institution
(dominant meaning) is located near a river, not because they interpreted the
target word with the ‘edge of a river’ (subordinate) meaning. Therefore we
also analyzed the responses using the participants’ original self-coding, and
the pattern of the results was the same: there were no changes in which
effects reached the criterion for significance.
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invalid (e.g., the participant clearly misheard the word, responded
with the target word).
Results
Proportions of correct responses in the semantic relatedness
priming task were high (M 0.97, SD 0.03, range 0.85–1.00)
showing that participants were attending to and successfully com-
prehending the priming sentences. Proportions of correct responses
on the vocabulary test were in the normal range (M  0.60, SD 
0.13, range  0.23–0.97). We will not describe the results for the
two remaining filler tasks (subjective reading/listening question-
naire, ART). These tasks were included to determine whether the
hypothesized unimodal priming advantage was modulated by in-
dividual differences. As there was no significant increase in prim-
ing for unimodal versus cross-modal conditions (see Main Anal-
ysis), we did not investigate individual differences in the
interaction.
Main analysis: Word association data. Three items were
removed from the analysis because they were mistakenly included,
despite having different levels of ambiguity in the two modalities:
(‘break’ which can also be spelled ‘brake,’ ‘bow’ which can be
pronounced to rhyme with ‘now’ or ‘know,’ ‘record’ which can be
pronounced with first or second syllable stress). Responses that
were coded as ‘invalid’ (1.5% of the data) were removed, which
left 5763 out of 5850 (78 participants  75 words) word associ-
ation responses in the analysis.
Each response was coded as ‘1’ if its meaning was consistent
with the meaning used in the priming sentences and ‘0’ if it related
to any other meaning (i.e., either ‘dominant’ or ‘other meaning’).
The average proportion of subordinate responses for the unprimed
conditions was 0.23.2
Mean proportions of sentence-consistent responses within the 6
Prime Type  Test Modality conditions are shown in Figure 3.
The responses were analyzed with a logistic mixed effects (LME)
model using the ‘lme4= package (Bates, Mächler, Bolker, &
Walker, 2015) and R statistical software (version 3.3.1; R Core
Team, 2013). The model took a 3 2 design with fixed effects for
Prime Type (Auditory, Visual or Unprimed), Test Modality
(Auditory or Visual), and the interaction. Within Prime Type,
Helmert coding was used to define two planned contrasts: (a)
Unprimed  2/3 versus Auditory or Visual  1/3, and (b)
Auditory  1/2 versus Visual  1/2. Deviation coding was used
for Test Modality: Auditory  1/2 versus Visual  1/2.
Our general approach to the LME modeling for both Experiment
1 and 2 was as follows. We first attempted to use the maximal
random effects structure, given that the inclusion of all random
slopes for fixed effects reduces the probability of Type I errors
(Barr, Levy, Scheepers, & Tily, 2013). If this model did not
converge, we removed the correlations among random effects
terms, followed by the by-item and by-subject random intercepts.
If these models did not converge, we removed the random effects
term that accounted for the least variance, continuing in this
manner until the model converged. All tests of fixed effects were
then evaluated using models with this random effects structure.
This method for dealing with nonconvergence is similar to the
data-driven approaches proposed by Bates, Kliegl, Vasishth, and
Baayen (2015) and Matuschek, Kliegl, Vasishth, Baayen, and
Bates (2017) in that it reduces model complexity by removing
terms that account for the least variance. However, in our case we
stopped model reduction as soon as the model converged, whereas
Bates et al. and Matuschek et al. sought to find the optimal model
complexity given the data (even if it is not the most complex
model that will converge).
In the present experiment, the final model contained a by-
subject and by-item random intercept.3 Likelihood ratio tests were
used to evaluate main effects and interactions, and significance of
individual model coefficients were obtained using the z statistic in
the model summary. The main effect of Test Modality was sig-
nificant,   0.14, SE  0.07, z  2.20, p  .028, 2(1)  4.78,
p  .029, though the difference was small (an increase of 0.03 in
the model-adjusted mean proportions for visual over auditory test).
The main effect of Prime Type was significant, 2(2) 36.90, p
.001. The coefficient for the first Prime Type contrast (Unprimed
vs. the two primed levels) was significant,   0.42, SE  0.07,
z  6.02, p  .001, and the coefficient for the second Prime Type
contrast (Auditory Prime vs. Visual Prime) was not significant,
  0.03, SE  0.08, z  0.40, p  .692. Bonferroni-
corrected Wald z tests for pairwise comparisons within Prime Type
2 The unprimed data show that 80% of the word meanings used in the
priming task were (as intended) subordinate (proportions of consistent
responses less than 0.4), 16% were balanced (0.4-0.6), and 4% of the
meanings were dominant in our sample (above 0.6).
3 During this model building procedure, by-subject intercept was re-
moved, but was added back in after the model failed to converge with the
last remaining by-subject random effect term.
Figure 3. Experiment 1 proportions of word-association test responses
that were consistent with the primed meanings across the 6 conditions. The
Auditory (left bars) and Visual (right bars) Test Modalities are grouped on
the x axis. Prime Type is color-coded: Auditory Prime (light gray), Visual
Prime (medium gray), and Unprimed (dark gray). Bars show the subject
grand means, and error bars show 95% CIs, adjusted to remove between-
subjects variance (Morey, 2008).
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were conducted using the ‘glht’ function from the ‘multcomp’
package for R (version 1.4–6; Hothorn, Bretz, & Westfall, 2008).
The results of these tests were consistent with those from the
model summary: both the Auditory Prime (z 5.48, p .001) and
Visual Prime (z 5.09, p .001) conditions were associated with
significantly more sentence-consistent responses than the
Unprimed conditions, and the Auditory and Visual Prime condi-
tions were not significantly different from one another (z0.40,
p 	 .999).
A likelihood ratio test for the full fixed effects model and a
model without the interaction term showed that the critical Prime
Type  Test Modality interaction was not significant, 2(2) 
2.65, p  .265. The significance tests for model coefficients
showed that Test Modality did not significantly interact with
either the first Prime Type contrast (i.e., unprimed vs. primed,
  0.19, SE 0.14, z1.36, p .173), or the second Prime
Type contrast (i.e., Auditory Prime vs. Visual Prime,   0.14,
SE  0.15, z  0.91, p  .366). One limitation of null-hypothesis
significance testing is that nonsignificant results are not interpre-
table, because a lack of sufficient evidence for rejecting the null
hypothesis does not constitute evidence for the absence of an
effect. For this reason, we compared the relative unstandardized
effect sizes for the priming effect (i.e., first Prime Type contrast,
unprimed vs. primed) and the critical interaction between the
second Prime Type contrast (i.e., Auditory Prime vs. Visual Prime)
and Test Modality. The model coefficient and 95% confidence
interval for the priming effect was 0.42 [0.29, 0.56], while for the
prime-test modality interaction this was 0.14 [0.16, 0.44], which
represents 33% of the size of the priming coefficient. We also
used a Bayesian analysis to follow up this null interaction result, as
this allowed us to quantify the likelihoods of each hypothesis
against the other, given the data. Bayes Factors were computed
using the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) approximation
from two competing LME models.4 The alternative (1) model
contained the full fixed effects structure, and the null (0) model
lacked the 2  2 interaction between the Prime Type second
contrast (A vs. V) and Test Modality (A vs. V). To compute the
Bayes Factor in favor of the null, we used the formula BF01 
e
BIC10
/2
, where 
BIC10 is the BIC for the alternative model
minus BIC for the null model (Masson, 2011; Wagenmakers,
2007). This analysis showed that, given the data, the null hypoth-
esis (that there is no Prime Modality  Test Modality interaction)
was about 49 times more likely than the alternative hypothesis,
BF01  49.40.
To determine whether there was significant priming in the two
cross-modal conditions (AV and VA), we compared the propor-
tions of sentence-consistent responses in each of these conditions
to that in the unprimed condition with the same test modality (UV
and UA, respectively). For each subset analysis, a full model was
constructed with condition (cross-modal primed or unprimed) as a
deviation-coded fixed factor and with by-subject and by-item
random intercepts and slopes for condition. The full model did not
converge for the Auditory Test Modality subset, so the by-subject
intercept was removed as it accounted for the least variance. The
model coefficient significance tests and model comparisons
showed that there were significantly more consistent-meaning
responses in both cross-modal conditions relative to the unprimed
conditions with the same test modality (AV vs. UV:   0.34,
SE  0.15, z  2.37, p  .018, 2(1)  5.30, p  .021; VA vs.
UA:   0.51, SE 0.15, z 3.48, p .001, 2(1) 10.62, p
.001).
We had not predicted a difference in the unprimed conditions as
a function of test modality, however there appeared to be a
numerical difference between the UA and UV subject means. In
addition, the model coefficient for Test Modality was significant,
and the pattern of means suggests that this effect may have been
driven by differences in the Unprimed conditions. We therefore
conducted an exploratory analysis to determine whether this dif-
ference was reliable. Using the ‘phia’ package for R (version
0.2–1; Rosario-Martinez, 2015), we tested of the effect of Test
Modality within each level of Prime Modality, where the estimates
and variances for each Prime Type  Test Modality condition
were calculated from the full LME model. This analysis showed
that there were significantly more sentence-consistent (subordi-
nate) word association responses in the UV condition compared
with the UA condition, 2(1)  5.28, p  .022. Although this
difference was not expected, it does not affect the interpretation of
the modality congruence effects of interest. We therefore defer
further consideration of this difference until the General Discus-
sion.
Participant awareness. In response to the awareness ques-
tions after the priming task, none of the participants predicted the
priming manipulation and 2 participants expressed an awareness of
the ambiguity. After the word-association test, 10 participants
mentioned ambiguity, 8 participants indicated an awareness of the
priming (e.g., repetition of words within the experiment, influence
of the earlier task on later task performance), and 4 participants
mentioned both ambiguity and priming.
To determine whether the results were driven by the ‘aware’
participants, the main analysis was repeated with only the ‘un-
aware’ participants. Participants were scored as ‘aware’ if they
mentioned the priming manipulation and/or presence of ambiguity
in response to any of the awareness questions. This categorization
was intended to exclude either type of awareness to obtain a more
conservative ‘unaware’ group. There were 23 (30%) aware and 55
(70%) unaware participants. The results of this subset analysis
were consistent with the main analysis and similar analyses in
previous studies (Betts et al., 2017; Rodd et al., 2016): the ‘un-
aware’ participants showed significant priming effects and no
significant interactions between prime and test modalities (see
supplemental materials for a detailed description of these results).
Discussion
We examined the effects of prime and test presentation modal-
ities on word-meaning priming, using proportions of word associ-
ation responses that are consistent with the primed (subordinate)
meaning as a measure of word-meaning preference. We found
significant effects of priming, with more prime-consistent word
association responses for words presented in primed than
unprimed conditions. These results replicate those of previous
auditory unimodal priming experiments (Betts et al., 2017; Rodd et
4 The BIC approximation method for Bayes Factors has the advantage of
being a straightforward solution for mixed effects models, however we
note that BICs have been criticized for biasing toward the simpler model,
that is, the null hypothesis (Vandekerckhove, Matzke, & Wagenmakers,
2014; Weakliem, 1999).
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al., 2016, 2013) and show for the first time that cross-modal
word-meaning priming can be observed. This is also the first time
that the word-meaning priming paradigm has been used in a fully
Web based experiment. The effect of priming on sentence-
consistent word association responses observed here (a raw in-
crease of 6.9% from unprimed to primed in the subject means) is
similar to that from a previous lab-based experiment with a com-
parable design (7.8% subject mean increase in Rodd et al., 2016;
Experiment 2, 20- and 40-min delay conditions), suggesting that
the switch to the Web based method did not result in a substantial
reduction in the observed priming effect.
There was no significant interaction between prime and test
modalities, meaning that there was no reliable priming advantage
for unimodal over cross-modal conditions. Because null effects are
difficult to interpret within a null hypothesis significance testing
framework, we also computed a Bayes Factor, which showed that
the data were more consistent with the absence of an interaction.
In addition, separate analyses comparing each cross-modal condi-
tion to the unprimed condition with the same test modality showed
significant priming in both cross-modal conditions. Taken to-
gether, these results provide initial support for the view that recent
experience with ambiguous words biases the subsequent interpre-
tation of these words in a modality-general way. Thus, the results
of this experiment are incompatible with a strong version of the
form-to-meaning account of word-meaning priming (Rodd et al.,
2013, 2016), which predicts greater priming for unimodal over
cross-modal prime-test conditions.
The word association task used in Experiment 1 is a measure of
preferences for ambiguous words’ meanings. This is useful be-
cause it provides a measure of the individual’s word interpretation
in the absence of any biasing context. However, there are a few
disadvantages of the word-association test. One is that each trial
produces a single binary response (either the associate is related to
the primed meaning or not), and this discrete categorization may
conceal subtle changes in word-meaning preferences that are in-
sufficient to change interpretation from the default (dominant)
meaning to the primed meaning. Consequently, this task may lack
the sensitivity necessary to observe modality congruence effects,
which could account for our null finding. A second issue is that the
word association task is unspeeded; participants are free to reflect
on their response and change it before committing. Thus it is
possible that shifts in meaning preferences that are observed using
the word association task are, in part, the result of strategic
responding, rather than online access to word meanings. A third
issue is that word association responses may be contaminated by
association types that are not purely semantic, such as collocations/
phrasemes and idioms (e.g., “rock and roll,” “armed to the teeth”),
and priming could potentially reflect changes in the availability of
these other types of associates. In Experiment 2 we use a different
test task and sought to replicate the results of Experiment 1 using
a speeded measure of word-meaning access.
Experiment 2
Experiment 2 used a test task in which participants made
speeded semantic relatedness judgments about individual ambig-
uous words and subordinate-related probe words (Cai et al., 2017).
Compared with word association, this task provides a more sen-
sitive, graded measure of the speed and ease with which readers
can access specific word meanings for ambiguous words. In this
task, the target ambiguous word is presented in spoken or written
form, followed by a written probe word related to the primed
(subordinate) meaning, for example, toast—SPEECH. Participants
must indicate via one of two key presses, as quickly and accurately
as possible, whether or not the meanings of the two words are
related. It thereby provides a more ‘online’ measure of interpreta-
tion compared with word association responses.
One challenge associated with using this speeded relatedness
task was that the primed words could potentially benefit from
form-based priming compared with the unprimed words. Repeti-
tion priming experiments show that word forms are more quickly
recognized if they have been recently seen/heard. In the present
experiment, having previously encountered an auditory or visual
word form earlier in the study may increase the recognition speed
of that same word form in the test trials. If this is the case, then it
could result in a modality-specific benefit to semantic relatedness
decisions, if the relatedness decision to the second word (the
probe) is influenced by the recognition speed of the first word (the
target). Critically, this potential benefit for primed words would
not reflect word-meaning priming. However, we expected form-
based priming to have a negligible effect on responses during the
semantic relatedness test task because repetition priming studies
using lexical decision show reduced or absent facilitation effects
when the word is initially presented in a sentence context (Levy &
Kirsner, 1989; MacLeod, 1989; but see also Monsell, 1985) and
when a homograph is presented in the context of different mean-
ings at prime and test (Masson & Freedman, 1990). Furthermore,
in the present experiment, speeded responses are made to a sub-
sequently presented probe word, not to the ambiguous target word
(which is the word that would benefit from form-based priming).
Thus, even if initial processing of the target is facilitated due to
form-based priming, the task still requires subsequent processing
of the probe word and access to semantics to make a relatedness
decision.
A second challenge for this task was equating stimulus timings
in the auditory and visual test modalities. The time-course of target
word recognition differs for spoken and written words, so the
relative timing of the probe word onset will also differ between the
two presentation modalities even when using the same stimulus
onset asynchronies (SOAs). Studies using similar methods have
shown that response patterns can vary as a function of the SOA
(e.g., Henderson, Snowling, & Clarke, 2013). This effect of SOA
is thought to reflect the time-course of activation and selection of
ambiguous word meanings, with an initial activation of all mean-
ings followed by the selection of one meaning and inhibition of
others. To reduce the possibility of observing large differences
between test modalities, the SOAs were roughly matched in the
auditory and visual test conditions. However, a main effect of test
modality would not be surprising, nor would it be interpretable
because of differences in the timing of spoken and word recogni-
tion. Importantly, our main research question relates to the inter-
action between prime and test modalities, which should still be
observable in the presence of a main effect of test modality.
Based on the results of Experiment 1, we expect that the
probability of interpreting the ambiguous words with their
sentence-consistent meanings will increase after priming, resulting
in more accurate ‘related’ responses for the primed targets and
subordinate-meaning probes at test. If priming also increases the
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speed of access to the primed word meanings then we expect faster
correct responses for primed versus unprimed target words. Fur-
thermore, if word-meaning priming affects modality-general as-
pects of lexical-semantic representations then, consistent with the
results of Experiment 1, we should observe statistically equivalent
priming in unimodal and cross-modal conditions. In contrast, if our
failure to observe a significant prime-test modality interaction in
Experiment 1 was a consequence of the limitations of the word
association method (e.g., lack of sensitivity, influence of off-line/
strategic processes), then here we might see this interaction due to
faster and/or more accurate responses for unimodal over cross-
modal conditions.
Method
Participants. The recruitment methods, exclusion criteria,
and payment were the same as in Experiment 1. For this experi-
ment we also set an inclusion criteria of response accuracy within
2 standard deviations of the mean percent correct in the test task.
Based on an unpublished pilot experiment with a similar test task
but without the priming manipulation, we set an a priori sample
size of 30 participants per version (180 in total). Seven participants
were excluded and replaced during data collection (4 for exceeding
the time limit, 1 for a low vocabulary score, 1 for low test task
accuracy, and 1 for low prime and test task accuracies), and there
was 1 extra participant as a result of accidental overrecruitment.
The final sample included 181 volunteers (87 women; M  29.5
years, SD  8.3, range  18–49). The study was approved by the
UCL Department of Experimental Psychology Ethics Committee.
Design. The design was the same as Experiment 1, except that
additional fillers were added to the semantic relatedness prime and
test tasks (see Materials).
Materials. The items and sentence materials were the same as
those from Experiment 1, with some exceptions described here.
Five items from Experiment 1 were replaced with new items (see
Table 1 and Table 2 in the Appendix). The semantic relatedness
test required the addition of filler items (words and sentences) for
both the priming and test tasks. This was because all experimental
items were ‘yes’ targets in the test task, so an equal number of ‘no’
filler targets were needed that did not differ from the ‘yes’ targets
in their overall proportions of item ambiguity or familiarity (via
priming). Thus there were an additional 78 ambiguous filler items
(52 primed, 26 unprimed) and 24 low-ambiguity filler items (all
primed) added to this experiment (see Table 5 in the Appendix).
The low-ambiguity filler items were included to reduce the sa-
lience of ambiguous words. The filler trials contained equal num-
bers of prime and test modalities, which were the same across all
versions of the experiment. Responses to these additional fillers
were not analyzed.
The new semantic relatedness test task required written probe
words for all target items. For experimental items and half of the
low-ambiguity fillers, the probe word was related to the primed
meaning, and all others were unrelated (see Table 6 in the Appen-
dix). The related probes were selected from common word asso-
ciation responses and dictionary definitions. These words were not
used in the item’s priming sentence or as the relatedness probe
following the priming sentence, nor were they related to the item’s
other meaning(s). The related and unrelated probes were matched
for number of letters (related: M  5.60, SD  1.72, unrelated:
M  5.59, SD  1.81, t(178)  0.04, p  .966) and log
frequency per million (related: M  3.72, SD  0.69, unrelated:
M  3.74, SD  0.61, t(175.07)  0.17, p  .865). In total there
were 124 items in the priming task (52 experimental, 52 ambigu-
ous filler, 24 low-ambiguity filler) and 180 items in the test task
(78 experimental, 78 ambiguous filler, 24 low-ambiguity filler).
The stimuli that were new to this experiment were recorded by
the same speaker as in Experiment 1, and matched with the rest of
the stimuli for RMS amplitude. Because the spoken single words
were part of a speeded task in this experiment, it was important to
more precisely control their onset/offset times than was possible
using the sound files from Experiment 1, which included short
pre-/post-token silences because of the automated segmentation of
these tokens from a continuous recording. For this reason, we
manually removed the inaudible periods before and after all of the
single word tokens.
Procedure. The procedure was the same as that in Experiment
1, apart from the test task. In each trial in the semantic relatedness
test, participants were presented with a single words (the target) in
either spoken or written form, followed by a written probe word,
and made a speeded semantic relatedness judgment (see Figure 4).
Trials began with a 500-ms fixation cross in the center of the
screen, followed by the auditory or visual target. On auditory trials,
the fixation cross remained on the screen while the audio played,
and the probe word was presented immediately upon the offset of
the sound file. On visual trials, the target was presented in lower-
case for 400 ms, followed by a 200-ms fixation (which served as a
mask) before the probe word onset. The probe word was always
presented visually in upper case, with response key reminders
below the word (‘f’  unrelated, ‘j’  related). Although it was
not possible to perfectly equate the probe presentation times
relative to target word recognition in the auditory and visual
modalities, we roughly matched the target-probe SOAs by using
the mean duration of the auditory sound files (556 ms) as a basis
for the 600 ms SOA in the visual condition. In both test
modalities, the probe remained on the screen until a valid
response was made, and a warning was presented if the re-
sponse took longer than 1500 ms.
After the test task instructions and examples, participants com-
pleted 12 practice trials comprised of 9 low-ambiguity targets and 3
ambiguous filler targets. Half of these target-probe pairs were seman-
tically related (e.g., cheese—BISCUIT) and the other half were un-
related (e.g., soap—DOOR). Half of the practice target words were
presented in spoken form and the other half in written form. Feedback
on accuracy was presented after each response, and a warning mes-
sage was shown if the response took longer than 1500 ms. The main
task began with 4 filler items, and the remaining items were random-
ized within the first or second block, with items presented in the same
block as in the priming task to minimize between-item variability in
prime-to-test durations. There were 3 evenly spaced, optional breaks
of up to 1 min during the task.
The task order was: semantic relatedness prime, vocabulary,
subjective reading/listening questionnaire, Author Recognition
Test (ART), semantic relatedness test. The whole session lasted
42 min on average. The mean estimated delay between the
prime and test encounters (i.e., the mean difference between the
midpoints of the two tasks) was 23 min.
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Results
Proportions of correct responses in the priming task were near
ceiling (M  0.95, SD  0.03, range  0.83–1.00). Proportions of
correct responses on the vocabulary test were in the expected range
(M  0.57, SD  0.13, range  0.26–1.00).
Main analysis: Semantic relatedness test.
Response Times. From the 14118 total responses to experi-
mental items (181 participants 78 items), there were 9 trials with
missing data due to technical problems. Of the remaining re-
sponses, any that were incorrect (23.8%) were removed from the
RT analysis. This relatively high error rate was expected given the
use of subordinate meanings and a speeded task. An examination
of accuracy by items revealed that, as expected, the error rates
were very variable (range 0.02–0.69), with higher error rates for
words with more subordinate (lower-frequency) meanings
(r(76)  0.49, p  .001). After plotting accuracy as a function
of meaning dominance, there were no target-probe pairs with error
rates that deviated greatly from the least squares line, so all items
were included. For time-based exclusions of individual trials, we
followed the general principle of minimal trimming with model
criticism (Baayen & Milin, 2010). We began with liberal cut-off
thresholds of less than 300 ms and greater than 2500 ms, then
examined the model diagnostic plots for evidence of outliers that
would suggest that further trimming is needed. To achieve this, we
first determined whether any dependent variable transformation
was needed to meet the assumptions of LME models, so that any
outliers could be identified after applying the transformation. A
comparison of model diagnostic plots (quantile-quantile, distribu-
tion of residuals) for the raw, log-transformed and inverse trans-
formed RTs revealed that the log transformation best met the
assumptions. The diagnostic plots revealed that no further time-
based trimming was necessary. The exclusion of correct responses
that were faster than 300 ms (3 trials) or slower than 2,500 ms (21
trials) left 10,732 responses in the analysis. Figure 5A shows the
subject grand mean RTs across the 6 conditions. In both test
modalities, correct responses to the target-probe pairs were faster
for items that were primed than unprimed.
The log-transformed RTs were analyzed with a linear mixed
effects model using the same general procedures described in
Experiment 1. As in Experiment 1, Prime Type was Helmert-
coded (contrast 1: Unprimed2/3 vs. Auditory or Visual 1/3;
contrast 2: Auditory  1/2 vs. Visual  1/2) and Test Modality
was deviation coded (Auditory  1/2 vs. Visual  1/2). The
model with the full random effects structure did not converge, even
after removing the correlations among random effects terms, and
after removing the random intercepts. We then removed the term
that accounted for the least variance in a stepwise fashion until the
model converged, which resulted in the removal of the by-item
slope for Test Modality and the by-subject slope for Prime Mo-
dality. Thus the final model contained a by-subject random inter-
cept and slopes for Test Modality and the interaction, and a
by-item random intercept and slopes for Prime Type and the
interaction.
As in Experiment 1, likelihood ratio tests were used to evaluate
significance of main effects and interactions. However, unlike
logistic mixed effects models, the model summaries for linear
mixed effects models created with the lme4 package for R do not
return significance tests for fixed effects. To test the significance
of the individual model coefficients, we used Satterthwaite’s ap-
proximation for degrees of freedom using the ‘lmerTest’ package
(Kuznetsova, Brockhoff, & Christensen, 2015), because this
method gives acceptable Type I error rates with these models
(Luke, 2017).
There was no significant main effect of Test Modality on the
RTs,   0.01, SE  0.01, t(173.73)  1.76, p  .080;
2(1)  1.91, p  .167. The main effect of Prime Type was
Figure 4. Trial structure for the auditory (A) and visual (B) conditions in the semantic relatedness test task in
Experiment 2. In auditory trials, the written probe word was presented on the offset of the spoken target word.
In visual trials, the written target word was presented for 400 ms, followed by a 200-ms fixation and the written
probe word.
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significant, 2(2) 30.94, p .001. The model coefficient for the
first Prime Type contrast (Unprimed vs. the two primed condi-
tions) was significant,   0.04, SE  0.01, t(74.64)  5.69,
p  .001, and the coefficient for the second Prime Type contrast
(Auditory Prime vs. Visual Prime) was marginally significant,  
0.01, SE  0.01, t(61.97)  1.96, p  .055. Pairwise comparisons
for Prime Type (with Bonferroni adjustment for multiple compar-
isons) confirmed that both the Auditory Prime (z  6.11, p 
.001) and Visual Prime (z4.19, p .001) conditions produced
faster correct semantic relatedness responses than the Unprimed
conditions. The Auditory and Visual Prime conditions were not
significantly different from one another after correcting for mul-
tiple comparisons (z  1.96, p  .152).
The model-adjusted mean difference between Auditory Prime
and Visual Prime conditions was in the same direction within the
two Test Modalities, but numerically larger in the Auditory com-
pared with Visual Test Modality (17 ms and 2 ms, respectively).
However, the critical Prime Type  Test Modality interaction was
not significant, 2(2)  3.12, p  .210. The model coefficients
were not significant for the interaction between Test Modality and
the first Prime Type contrast (unprimed vs. primed),   0.01,
SE  0.01, t(102.56)  0.83, p  .409, or between Test Modality
and the second Prime Type contrast (Auditory Prime vs. Visual
Prime),   0.02, SE  0.01, t(101.51)  1.49, p  .140.
As in Experiment 1, we compared the relative unstandardized
effect sizes for the priming effect versus the critical Prime
Modality  Test Modality interaction. The model coefficient
and 95% confidence intervals for the priming effect was 0.04
[0.05, 0.02], whereas for the prime-test modality interaction
it was 0.02 [0.04, 0.01], that is, 50% of the priming coef-
ficient. We also followed up this null finding by computing
Bayes Factors to compare the likelihoods of each hypothesis
given the data. This analysis revealed that the null hypothesis
(no interaction between the prime and test modalities) was
about 35 times more likely than the alternative hypothesis,
BF01  35.16.
To determine whether there was significant priming specifi-
cally in the two cross-modal conditions, subset analyses were
conducted on each cross-modal condition and the unprimed
condition with the same test modality (i.e., AV vs. UV, and VA
vs. UA). Within each subset, full models were constructed with
log RT as the dependent variable, condition (cross-modal
primed or unprimed) as a deviance-coded fixed factor, and
by-subject and by-item random intercepts and slopes for con-
dition. Likelihood ratio tests showed that the RTs in both
cross-modal conditions were significantly faster than RTs in the
unprimed conditions with the same test modality (AV vs. UV:
  0.03, SE  0.01, t(48.04)  3.82, p  .001, 2(1)  12.46,
p  .001; VA versus UA:   0.03, SE  0.01,
t(55.73)  3.18, p  .002, 2(1)  9.39, p  .002).
Accuracy. Of the total 14,109 trials, we excluded any trials
with RTs faster than 300 ms (4 trials) and slower than 2500 ms (43
trials), regardless of response accuracy. This was the same criteria
used in the RT analysis, and is based on the assumption that these
very fast and slow responses reflect accidental button presses and
lapses in attention, respectively. The subject grand mean propor-
tions of errors by conditions are shown in Figure 5B. In both test
modalities, the proportions of errors were lower when the item was
primed versus unprimed, and slightly lower for items primed with
a visual versus auditory sentence.
Logistic mixed effects models converged after removing the
by-subject slope for Test Modality, thus the final model included
a by-subject intercept and slope for Prime Type and the interaction,
and a by-item intercept and slope for Prime Type, Test Modality
and the interaction. There was a significant main effect of Prime
Type, 2(2) 27.32, p .001. The model coefficients for the first
Figure 5. Experiment 2 response times (A; in ms) and proportions of errors (B) in the semantic relatedness test
task. Bars are grouped by Test Modality on the x axis (Auditory, left bars; Visual, right bars) and color-coded
by Prime Type: Auditory (light gray), Visual (medium gray) or Unprimed (dark gray). Bars show the subject
grand averages, and error bars show 95% CIs, adjusted to remove between-subjects variance (Morey, 2008).
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Prime Type contrast (Unprimed vs. the two primed levels) was
significant,   0.35, SE  0.07, z  5.39, p  .001, and the
model coefficient for the second Prime Type contrast (Auditory
Prime vs. Visual Prime) was also significant,   0.21, SE 0.07,
z  2.89, p  .004. Pairwise comparisons with Bonferroni cor-
rection confirmed that all three levels of Prime Type were signif-
icantly different from one another; responses were more accurate
for items in the Auditory Prime versus Unprimed condition (z 
3.47, p  .002), for Visual Prime versus Unprimed (z  5.83, p 
.001) and for Visual Prime versus Auditory Prime (z  2.89, p 
.012). There was also a significant main effect of Test Modality,
  0.17, SE  0.06, z  2.68, p  .007, 2(1)  6.77, p  .009,
with more accurate responses for Visual Test compared with
Auditory Test. This was perhaps due to participants occasionally
mishearing the spoken target words in the Auditory Test condi-
tions, or to the cost of modality switching between the auditory
target and visual probe.
Likelihood ratio tests showed that the Prime Type  Test
Modality interaction was not significant, 2(2)  3.08, p  .215.
The model coefficient for the interaction between Test Modality
and the first Prime Type contrast (primed vs. unprimed) was not
significant,   0.20, SE  0.11, z  1.76, p  .079, nor was the
coefficient for the critical interaction with the second Prime Type
contrast (Auditory Prime vs. Visual Prime),   0.03, SE 
0.15, z  0.19, p  .849. The model coefficient and 95%
confidence intervals for the priming effect was 0.35 [0.23, 0.48],
whereas for the prime-test modality interaction it was 0.03
[0.31, 0.26], that is, 9% of the magnitude of the priming
coefficient. A Bayesian analysis comparing the full model (alter-
native) against the model without the 2  2 interaction between
prime and test modalities (null) showed that, given the data, there
was much stronger evidence in favor of the null compared with the
alternative hypothesis, BF01  148.41.
We examined the presence of cross-modal priming in the errors
using subset analyses for each cross-modal condition (AV and
VA) and the unprimed condition with the same test modality (UV
and UA, respectively). Within each subset, full models were con-
structed with accuracy as the dependent variable, condition (cross-
modal priming or unprimed) as a fixed factor, and by-subject and
by-item random intercepts and slopes for condition. Likelihood
ratio tests for the full model against the reduced model (i.e.,
without condition as a fixed factor) revealed that accuracy was
significantly higher in both cross-modal conditions compared with
the unprimed conditions with the same test modality (AV vs. UV:
  0.37, SE 0.09, z 4.01, p .001, 2(1) 13.81, p .001;
VA vs. UV:   0.35, SE  0.10, z  3.60, p  .001, 2(1) 
10.92, p  .001).
Participant awareness. After the priming task, none of the
participants predicted that the experiment would involve a priming
manipulation, and 30 participants mentioned the ambiguous words
in the priming sentences. After the test task, 48 participants men-
tioned the use of ambiguous words, 1 participant’s response indi-
cated awareness of the priming manipulation, and 4 participants
mentioned both ambiguity and priming. Using the same categori-
zation criteria as in Experiment 1, there were 68 (38%) ‘Aware’
participants and 113 (62%) ‘Unaware’ participants. Compared
with Experiment 1, here there was a greater proportion of partic-
ipants who noticed the ambiguous words. This increased aware-
ness may have been due to the inclusion of ambiguous filler items
in the present experiment, which increased the total number and
proportion of ambiguous words in the experiment.
To determine whether the pattern of results was dependent on
the ‘aware’ participants, the main analysis was repeated with only
the ‘unaware’ participants. For both RT and accuracy analyses, the
critical pattern of results was consistent with the main analysis: the
‘unaware’ participants showed significant priming effects and no
significant interactions between prime and test modalities (see
supplemental materials for detailed results).
Discussion
Using a speeded semantic relatedness test task, we replicated the
main findings of Experiment 1 by showing that cross-modal prim-
ing can be observed and that this effect is not significantly reduced
compared with unimodal priming. Responses to the ambiguous
targets and subordinate-related probe words were significantly
faster and more accurate for target words in all primed compared
with unprimed conditions. Importantly, the effects of priming were
significant in the cross-modal conditions in particular, as revealed
by comparisons between each cross-modal condition and the
unprimed condition with the same test modality. In the subject
mean RTs, there was a numerical interaction characterized by a
larger advantage for the auditory prime condition with the auditory
compared with visual test. However, this pattern was only partially
consistent with the prediction of a unimodal benefit: there was no
analogous advantage for the visual prime over auditory prime
condition with the visual test. Moreover, there was no such nu-
merical pattern in the error data, and the interaction between prime
and test modality was not reliable in either the RT or error analysis.
Thus, contrary to our original predictions, and consistent with the
results of Experiment 1, we found no evidence for a benefit of
modality congruence on word-meaning priming.
There was a significant main effect of test modality in the
accuracy analysis in that responses tended to be less accurate in the
auditory test conditions. As mentioned in the introduction, we
hesitate to draw any conclusions from a main effect of test mo-
dality because of the differences in the timing of auditory versus
visual target word recognition and relative probe word onset. One
possibility is that the (un)certainty of target word recognition
differed between modalities, with a greater likelihood of mis-
hearing than mis-reading the word. Another possibility is that there
was a modality switching cost, making the auditory trials more
difficult than the visual trials given that both target word modal-
ities were followed by a visual probe word.
We also found a significant difference between the two prime
modalities such that the written prime sentences resulted in slightly
but significantly fewer errors at test, as well as marginally slower
response times, compared with the spoken prime sentences. Again,
there are a number of possible reasons for this difference, includ-
ing a higher probability of mis-hearing the auditory priming sen-
tences or the ability to spend more time reading the visual sen-
tences, given that the priming task was self-paced. This question
could be examined in future research by equating the priming
sentence exposure times for auditory and visual conditions with
rapid visual serial presentation. Importantly, these main effects do
not undermine our ability to draw conclusions about cross-modal
priming and the (lack of a) critical prime-test modality interaction.
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General Discussion
The two experiments reported here investigated whether the
impact of recent experience on the interpretation of ambiguous
words involves predominantly modality-specific or modality-
general changes within the lexical-semantic system. We found a
clear and consistent pattern of results. There was an overall effect
of priming, including significant priming for the cross-modal con-
ditions. Given that previous word-meaning priming studies have
used only auditory unimodal conditions, the present work demon-
strates for the first time that word-meaning priming occurs in
cross-modal and visual unimodal prime-test conditions. Critically,
we found no evidence for the hypothesized cross-over interaction
between prime and test modality resulting from greater priming in
unimodal relative to cross-modal conditions.
In Experiment 1, we examined the effects of modality congru-
ence on word association responses. Word association is the stan-
dard test of word-meaning priming and allowed us to verify that
priming does occur in unimodal auditory conditions, thus replicat-
ing previous results (Betts et al., 2017; Rodd et al., 2016, 2013). In
Experiment 2 we sought converging evidence using a speeded
semantic relatedness decision task that was chosen to assess the
speed and ease of word-meaning access, as opposed to the all-or-
nothing measure of meaning preference provided by word associ-
ation (Cai et al., 2017). Our results with this task were clear in
showing significant priming overall and no significant advantage
for unimodal over cross-modal conditions in either the response
times or accuracy measures. It therefore appears that word-
meaning priming affects not only the probability of selecting the
primed meaning of ambiguous words, as evidenced by the increase
in sentence-consistent word association responses (Experiment 1)
and correct semantic relatedness decisions (Experiment 2), but also
the speed of access to these meanings, as seen by the faster correct
responses in the semantic relatedness test task (Experiment 2).
Compared with short-term priming paradigms, the present stud-
ies used relatively high proportions of ambiguous words and
primed items. This may have made it more likely that participants
noticed the repetition of words across tasks and/or the use of
ambiguous words. Indeed, after the test phase, around 1/3 of
participants mentioned one or both of these aspects of the study. In
Experiment 1, very few participants (3%) mentioned ambiguity
after the prime phase. This suggests that awareness of the ambi-
guity mainly emerged from the test phase, when participants were
required to interpret each word in the absence of immediate
biasing context. In Experiment 2 the participants who mentioned
ambiguity after the prime phase were also in the minority (17%),
although this percentage was higher than in Experiment 1, perhaps
because the Experiment 2 prime phase contained about twice as
many ambiguous items. Importantly, the key results of these
experiments were unchanged when we analyzed the subsets of
participants who did not express any awareness of the ambiguous
words and/or priming manipulation. This is consistent with previ-
ous results (Betts et al., 2017; Rodd et al., 2016) and provides
further evidence against the possibility that word-meaning priming
is attributable to strategic responding in the ‘aware’ participants.
Although the present studies used a Web-based design, the
priming effects on word association responses reported here were
similar in magnitude to those observed in previous lab-based
studies (Rodd et al., 2016, 2013), and our results using a speeded
response time measure of word-meaning priming were similarly
robust. The recent shift toward conducting experiments online
reflects the fact that Internet-based studies provide the ability to
collect large amounts of data more quickly and inexpensively, and
from a more diverse set of participants, than is generally feasible
with lab-based research (Woods, Velasco, Levitan, Wan, &
Spence, 2015). This is particularly important given the ongoing
issues with low statistical power and false positives in psycholog-
ical research (Button et al., 2013; Open Science Collaboration,
2015). Although there are a number of important issues to consider
when conducting experiments over the Internet (Plant, 2016;
Woods et al., 2015), there has been substantial progress made in
developing and testing solutions to these issues, with reassuring
results (Barnhoorn et al., 2015; Germine et al., 2012; Hilbig, 2016;
van Steenbergen & Bocanegra, 2016). In our view, Web-based
experiments are a promising avenue for conducting well-powered
experimental research with more representative samples.
The Locus of Word-Meaning Priming
These results are inconsistent with the proposed explanation put
forward by Rodd et al. (2013) that word-meaning priming involves
changes in form-to-meaning connections. In the Rodd et al. (2004)
model and triangle models more generally (Harm & Seidenberg,
2004), form-to-meaning connections determine how orthographic
or phonological inputs are mapped onto semantic representations.
If word-meaning priming reflects changes to connection weights
between form and semantic units then this should produce a
stronger bias toward the recently encountered meaning in uni-
modal than cross-modal conditions. In its strongest form, this
account might even predict that cross-modal priming should be
absent (because different connection weights mediate access to
meaning from written and spoken words). In contrast to this
prediction, we found significant priming in all primed conditions
and no significant interaction between prime and test modalities.
Null effects are difficult to interpret using frequentist statistics,
and do not allow us to make inferences about the absence of an
effect of modality congruence on word-meaning priming. How-
ever, there are a few reasons why the present results are nonethe-
less informative. First, we computed Bayes Factors that allowed us
to directly compare the likelihoods of the null and alternative
hypotheses, given the data. These results showed that the data were
more consistent with the absence of an interaction between prime
and test modalities (i.e., the null hypothesis), which suggests that
our failure to observe a statistically significant interaction was not
due to low power. Second, we found that, on average across
analyses, the model coefficient for the modality-specific effect was
about 1/3 of that for the overall priming effect. This suggests that,
even if a true unimodal priming advantage exists, the effect is
likely to be small relative to the modality-independent component
of word-meaning priming. Finally, the presence of significant
cross-modal priming in both experiments is a positive finding that
is in clear contradiction with the strongest version of the form-to-
meaning hypothesis. Based on these observations, then, we con-
clude that these results rule out a simple, unimodal form-to-
meaning interpretation of the word-meaning priming effect.
Rodd et al. (2016) proposed an alternative to the form-to-
meaning hypothesis for the locus of word-meaning priming. They
suggested that the changes to the lexical-semantic system could
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occur within the semantic layer as a result of changes to the
recurrent connections between semantic units. These recurrent
connections form attractor basins for each separate meaning. Dur-
ing the semantic settling process, there is activation of semantic
units from the word form layer which continues until the network
reaches a stable semantic representation. As any individual seman-
tic unit becomes activated, the recurrent connections will increase
the chances of activation of other units that tended to be coactive
during learning. If the prime encounter strengthens these recurrent
connections, this would result in an attractor basin that is wider
and/or deeper for that particular meaning, making it (a) more likely
to be selected, and (b) selected more rapidly (Becker et al., 1997).
More generally, this interpretation would suggest that recent ex-
perience with word usage causes a long-lasting adjustment to
relative meaning dominance levels within the semantic system.
At this point it is unclear why the effect of priming would occur
through changes to the within-semantic connections, rather than in
the form-to-meaning connections. From a communicative point of
view, it would make sense for knowledge about word meanings to
be modality-general (this is discussed in the later section “Impli-
cations for comprehension of written and spoken language”).
However, it is not clear whether this effect arises because of a
systematic difference in the plasticity of the two types of repre-
sentations, or because of differences in the representational struc-
tures (e.g., sparseness). Meaning representations are relatively
sparse and are less likely to overlap across a set words, whereas
phonemes/letters are relatively dense and more likely to overlap by
chance. Thus any strengthening of form-to-meaning connections
as a result of the prime encounter could perhaps be easily cancelled
out by subsequent encounters with words that overlap in form but
have very different meanings (e.g., bark, bat, break). This expla-
nation could be examined in the future through simulations, and
through experiments that manipulate the degree of overlap in form
and meaning across words encountered between prime and test.
Another possibility is that the significant cross-modal priming
we observed is the result of coactivation of the orthographic and
phonological word forms during the prime and/or test phases.
Coactivation during the prime phase might result in a strengthen-
ing of the form-to-meaning mappings for both phonological and
orthographic representations of the word, and would therefore lead
to equivalent unimodal and cross-modal priming at test. It is also
possible that coactivation of the two word forms occurs during the
test encounter, which could result in equivalent unimodal and
cross-modal priming, even if the priming encounter produced a
modality-specific change to the lexical-semantic network. How-
ever, our results are not consistent with previous evidence for a
stronger mediating role of phonological than orthographic repre-
sentations in cross-modal priming (Rueckl & Mathew, 1999),
resulting in an asymmetric patterns of cross-modal priming with
unspeeded priming sentences and a speeded test task (Monsell,
1985). Nonetheless, at present it is not possible to distinguish
between the word form coactivation and modality-general seman-
tic layer explanations.
One concern is that our within-participant manipulations of
modality resulted in a bias toward modality-general processing.
However, if anything, this design has been shown to produce a bias
in the opposite direction, that is, a unimodal over cross-modal
priming advantage, compared with a between-subjects manipula-
tion of modality. This finding is thought to reflect voluntary
encoding strategies and/or the increased attention drawn to per-
ceptual features of the stimuli in mixed modality trial blocks
(Brown, Neblett, Jones, & Mitchell, 1991; Lukatela, Eaton,
Moreno, & Turvey, 2007; Mulligan, 2011). This previous work
suggests that the present studies may have been biased toward
observing a unimodal priming advantage, making the lack of such
an advantage even more striking. Whether the use of mixed-
modality trials had any biasing effect in word-meaning priming is
an open empirical question that could be examined in future work
with a between-subjects design and use of a single modality
throughout the experiment (Lukatela et al., 2007). Future studies
could also investigate the role of dual encoding during priming by
presenting visual/auditory masks during the auditory/visual prim-
ing sentences to see whether this results in a unimodal priming
advantage (Vallet, Brunel, & Versace, 2010).
Our results can also be interpreted within models that propose
localist word-meaning nodes. In these models, there are multiple,
separate entries for individual word meanings, which compete for
selection. Spoken and written word forms map on to the same
word-meaning node. We presume that word-meaning priming
could be explained in these models in terms of (e.g.) a reduction in
the unidirectional inhibitory connection weight from the dominant
to the subordinate word-meaning node, so that on the next presen-
tation of the word, the node for the primed (subordinate) meaning
will more easily overcome competition from the dominant mean-
ing node and thus be both (a) more likely to be selected and (b)
selected more rapidly compared with the unprimed case.
However, we note that localist models have other weaknesses
relative to distributed models in their ability to account for lexical-
semantic representations. Namely, the representation of a word’s
meaning as a single unit, rather than as a more flexible pattern of
activation, fails to capture the degrees and ‘shades of meaning’ that
occurs in language, and in particular for polysemous words (Rodd
et al., 2004). In contrast, distributed connectionist models repre-
sent the ‘core’ meaning of polysemous words as a subset of
semantic units, and each individual instance or ‘sense’ of the word
can be represented as variations on this core semantic pattern.
While localist word-meaning nodes are useful for representing
words with multiple unrelated meanings because they have no
problem implementing one-to-many form-to-meaning mappings,
they are thus less parsimonious as an explanation of polysemous
word representation since different nodes would be required for
even subtle variations to a word’s meaning. They also require that
the lexicon makes a categorical distinction between these two
types of ambiguity, which is generally considered to be of a more
continuous nature ranging from highly related word senses to
highly unrelated word meanings but with a large set of interme-
diate meanings for which classification is unclear. Although these
data do not provide any evidence against the presence of word
nodes, we suggest that they can most parsimoniously be explained
in terms of changes in the form-to-meaning connection strengths
between both auditory and visual word form units and the semantic
units, and/or in the shape of the attractor structure within the
semantic layer.
Thus far, we have discussed the implications of our results in the
context of a single-system account of lexical processing. However,
given that learning mechanisms feature heavily in our explanation
of the mechanism underlying word meaning priming, it is worth
considering alternatives to a single-system account. In particular, a
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complementary systems account (McClelland, McNaughton, &
O’Reilly, 1995) has been highly influential in explaining many
aspects of learning and memory processing. In recent years this
account has been fruitfully applied to language learning and pro-
cessing, most particularly in the context of learning the form and
meaning of new spoken words (e.g., Dumay & Gaskell, 2007).
According to complementary systems models of language, the
main repository of lexical knowledge is cortical and relatively
stable, whereas new learning is mediated by hippocampal systems
to avoid interference with existing knowledge (Davis & Gaskell,
2009). Plausibly, the priming phase of our paradigm resulted in
new learning not in the cortical semantic network as described
above but in the hippocampus. This new hippocampal representa-
tion might act to bind the lexical representation of the ambiguous
word with its sentential context, such that the context is able to
influence disambiguation of the same word at a later time-point.
An involvement of the hippocampus in the comprehension of
language on a day-to-day basis has been proposed by Duff and
Brown-Schmidt (2012), and helps to explain why hippocampal
amnesics show deficits in their ability to retrieve senses of ambig-
uous words (Klooster & Duff, 2015). We cannot select between
single- and multiple-system models on the basis of the current
data—future studies of the neural foundations of word-meaning
priming or the impact of hippocampal amnesia would be valuable.
However, our results do imply that, under a complementary sys-
tems account of word-meaning priming, whatever word represen-
tations become bound together must be abstract enough to be
independent of perceptual modality.
Implications for Comprehension of Written and
Spoken Language
More generally, these results tell us about the degree to which
experience with spoken and written language is interlinked. Our
data suggest that when listeners/readers update their knowledge
about the distributional properties of word meanings in one mo-
dality, this experience can impact on how these words are pro-
cessed in the other modality, and it is possible that this transfer
generalizes to other types of linguistic learning and experience. For
instance, there is some evidence for transfer across modalities after
the consolidation of newly learned words and meanings (van der
Ven, Takashima, Segers, & Verhoeven, 2015). There is clear
utility in the existence of shared lexical-semantic representations
such that comprehension in one modality would generally benefit
from knowledge accumulated across all experience with language.
Indeed, there is research to suggest that listening comprehension is
closely related to reading comprehension in children (e.g., Diaki-
doy, Stylianou, Karefillidou, & Papageorgiou, 2005; Hagtvet,
2003; Nation & Snowling, 2004) and that reading experience is
linked to vocabulary growth across the life span (Sullivan &
Brown, 2015). These relationships may be attributable, in part, to
knowledge about word usage that is gained through individual
encounters with either orthographic or spoken word forms, but
which can then be accessed and applied more generally across
different types of communication. Although there are additional
factors within modalities that have differential effects on compre-
hension success, such as verbal working memory and orthographic
decoding abilities, beyond this it may be that comprehension
depends largely on modality-general linguistic knowledge.
However, the modality-general influence of linguistic experi-
ence observed here does not preclude the potential for modality-
specific learning about word meanings. In particular, if the reader/
listener has evidence that words are consistently used to mean
different things in different modalities, then we might expect these
individuals to keep track of these systematic, modality-specific
usage patterns. Evidence that listeners can, in some situations,
keep track of how ambiguous words are used differently in specific
linguistic environments comes from a recent study of the effect of
English accents (British vs. American) on the interpretation of
words that have different dominant meanings in the two dialects
(e.g., “bonnet”). Cai et al. (2017) found that native British English
speakers were more likely to make word association responses
related to the American-dominant meaning (e.g., type of hat) than
British-dominant meaning (e.g., car part) when the words were
spoken in an American accent. However, this shift in preference
toward American-dominant meanings did not transfer to written
words that were intermixed with the presentation of U.S. accented
spoken words which, furthermore, did not differ from written
words tested in the absence of any spoken words. Thus, in this
case, accented spoken words provide evidence for reliable differ-
ences in the likely meanings of words that are used differently by
American and British English speakers. Hence, when appropri-
ately signaled, modality-specific interpretations of spoken and
written words can be observed. One explanation for these
modality-specific effects, in conjunction with the results of the
present studies, is that individuals will use their same ‘default’
(dominant) interpretation for both spoken and written ambiguous
words, unless there are systematic cues (such as accent) that
provide additional information on usage that can bias interpreta-
tion toward a different meaning. In the case of the Cai et al. study,
the biasing cue (speaker accent) was uniquely present in the
spoken words.
This explanation of the differences between the current exper-
iments and Cai et al.’s (2017) results predicts that modality-
specific priming might be observed under conditions where par-
ticipants were exposed to a large number of instances of the
ambiguous words, but where the meaning usage differed system-
atically between the two modalities. It would also predict that
individuals could be sensitive to any naturally occurring system-
atic differences in relative meaning frequencies between spoken
and written language. For instance, it might be that slang/collo-
quial word meanings are used more often in speech than in print
(e.g., the British colloquial ‘tired’ meaning of the word “shat-
tered”), and the opposite may be true for more formal word
meanings (e.g., the ‘say’ meaning of the word “state”; Purcell-
Gates, 2001). In addition, vocabulary in written language has
shown to be more diverse than that in spoken language (Chafe &
Danielewicz, 1987). Given that most words in English are ambig-
uous to some extent, the greater formality and variety of vocabu-
lary in written language may have a systematic effect on word
meaning frequencies between modalities. Our Experiment 1 results
hint at this possibility of different distributional statistics for word
meanings in spoken and written language in that the proportion of
subordinate meaning word association responses was greater for
written than spoken words in the unprimed condition. This might
indicate that subordinate meanings are used more often in text, and
hence that ambiguous word usage in print is, on average, more
balanced in terms of relative meaning frequencies. Unfortunately it
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is not possible to answer this question with our current data, and
because this was an exploratory finding, we note that the differ-
ence may be due to chance. Future experiments could examine
whether (a) systematic differences exist in the relative frequencies
of word meanings in text versus speech, and (b) listeners/readers
can keep track of such differences and use them to aid disambig-
uation.
To summarize, we found that recent exposure to ambiguous
words in subordinate-meaning contexts biases later interpretation
of those words toward the same meaning, and this biasing effect is
not significantly modulated by the (in)congruency between the
presentation modalities of the prime and test encounters. Recent
experience with ambiguous words therefore appears to influence
word meaning interpretation in a modality-general way. These
results are not consistent with the previous proposal that word-
meaning priming results solely from changes to the connections
from either the orthographic or phonological word form to a
particular meaning representation. Instead we suggest that the
locus of the biasing effect occurs primarily within amodal lexical-
semantic representations or as a result of the coactivation of
written and spoken word forms, with the result that meanings that
were recently encountered become more readily activated and
more likely to be retrieved.
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Appendix
Experimental Stimuli and Stimuli-Condition Assignment
Table 1
Lists of Experimental Ambiguous Words Used in Experiment 1
List 1 List 2 List 3 List 4 List 5 List 6
Bark Appendix Ball Break Bow Band
Bat Bar Bed Card Bowl Cabinet
Bonnet Box Bulb Cricket Button Change
Case Calf Craft Cross Cap Chest
Cup Hand Fan Deck Cold Coach
Joint Landing Iron Gear Figure Fence
Lace Organ Issue Jam Glasses Key
Pen Plug Park Mark Gum Letter
Punch Spade Pipe Mould Interest† Match
Ring Stitch Pupil Mouse Nail Palm
Sink Straw Staff Record Note Sign
Skip Trailer Step† Spring Panel Speaker
Temple Wave Watch Toast Trunk Strike
Note. The 78 ambiguous words were pseudorandomly split into 6 lists of 13 words (matched for mean dominance) for the
purpose of counterbalancing items across the 6 conditions.
† Item was included in the analysis of Experiment 1 but removed in Experiment 2.  Item was removed from the word
association analyses. Removing these items did not affect the matching of lists for mean dominance.
Table 2
Lists of Experimental Ambiguous Words Used in Experiment 2
List 1 List 2 List 3 List 4 List 5 List 6
Bark Bar Ball Calf Appendix Band
Bonnet Figure Bed Card Bank Cabinet
Button Hand Bulb Cricket Bat Change
Case Joint Craft Cross Bowl Chest
Cup Landing Iron Gear Box Coach
Fan Nut Issue Jam Cap Fence
Lace Organ Park Log Cold Key
Pen Plug Pipe Mark Deck Letter
Punch Speaker Pupil Mould Glasses Match
Ring Spring Skip Mouse Interest Palm
Sink Step Spade Plant Mole Sign
Temple Stitch Staff Toast Nail Straw
Trailer Wave Watch Trunk Note Strike
Note. The 78 ambiguous words were pseudorandomly split into 6 lists of 13 words (matched for mean dominance) for the
purpose of counterbalancing items across the 6 conditions.
 Item was new to the stimuli set in Experiment 2.
Table 3
List Condition Assignment for Each of the 6 Task Versions in Experiments 1 and 2
List Version 1 Version 2 Version 3 Version 4 Version 5 Version 6
List 1 AA AV VA VV UA UV
List 2 AV VA VV UA UV AA
List 3 VA VV UA UV AA AV
List 4 VV UA UV AA AV VA
List 5 UA UV AA AV VA VV
List 6 UV AA AV VA VV UA
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Table 4
Experiment 1 Ambiguous Words, Sentences, and Probe Words for the Semantic Relatedness Priming Task
Item Sentence Probe Related
Skip The home owners were advised to hire a skip Rubbish Y
Bat The fruit bat is a flying mammal Wings Y
Sink There was a soap pump on the side of the sink Wriggle N
Case The crime was suspected to be a case of mistaken identity Division N
Bark The branches and the bark had been damaged by the storm Closed N
Lace The teacher stopped Lily to tie up her lace Student Y
Cup The plaque on the cup was engraved Win Y
Bonnet Petals decorated the brim of the girl’s bonnet Clothes Y
Temple One of the pressure points of the body is the temple Comb N
Joint The police searched the suspected drug dealer and found a joint Duck N
Punch The guests made the most of the free punch Roast N
Ring She picked up the phone to give her daughter a ring Fry N
Pen The pig pen was muddier than ever Animals Y
Plug The plumber had forgotten to put the plug in Chalk N
Calf The muscle in his leg had weakened, particularly the calf Injury Y
Appendix The author put his memos in the appendix of the book. Writer Y
Trailer The new film trailer was released yesterday Snore N
Box The fighter had to box better than he had before Seat N
Wave He couldn’t hear what she said but he saw her wave Greeting Y
Straw The foal was born on the straw in the barn Horse Y
Stitch The athlete was in a lot of pain because of the stitch Exercise Y
Organ The young woman wanted to know how to play the organ Musician Y
Landing There was very little space on the first floor landing Snail N
Bar Access was prevented with a long wooden bar Slim N
Spade The gambler knew that his opponent wanted a spade Pint N
Hand The clock had a broken hand, so it didn’t give the time Table N
Park With his new car, he struggled to park Ordinary N
Bulb The wire connecting the bulb was broken Wise N
Fan Some celebrities don’t interact with members of their fan base Chief N
Issue Alex had edited the most recent issue of the publication Left N
Step She daren’t take one more step in the area Sugar N
Racket The boys tried to watch from their treehouse Children Y
Pipe The grandfather picked up his pipe to smoke Old Y
Iron A simple school science experiment involves iron filings Students Y
Craft There were three funnels along the craft Color N
Pupil Lizzie was the best pupil in the class Exemplary Y
Staff When walking up-hill, the hiker used a staff to help Mountain Y
Ball There were many professional dancers at the ball this year. Dirt N
Bed There were weeds growing in the bed Garden Y
Card She didn’t have a Christmas card to give him Action N
Break The vase was wrapped so that it wouldn’t break Protected Y
Deck The magician asked the volunteer to pick from the deck Trick Y
Mark The lecturer hadn’t had time to give the essay a mark Chew N
Mould He wanted to use tools to help him mould the statue Follow N
Cross His mum was extremely cross with him Weather N
Spring To make it jump, the toy had a spring inside it Marry N
Jam The roadworks caused a jam all through the town Construction Y
Record Today was the hottest day on record Timber N
Gear The new employees were told to put on the work gear Instruction Y
Mouse The Apple iMac boasts a new mouse or track-pad device Technology Y
Cricket Only the male cricket can produce a sound Noise Y
Toast The host was asked to make a toast Speech Y
Trunk Pat lifted the lid of the trunk to check what was inside Look Y
Nail She was upset that she had broken her nail Woman Y
Figure All of the bankers knew what the figure would be Attract N
Panel There was a temporary wooden panel separating the two rooms Wall Y
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Table 4 (continued)
Item Sentence Probe Related
Bow The girl tied a bow around her ponytail Daily N
Note The lower note suited the singer’s voice better than the higher one Require N
Cap The purchasers were subject to a spending cap Money Y
Gum The boy could feel his new tooth coming through his gum Fade N
Interest The bank charges more interest than others Face N
Cold All the employees had caught the same cold that week Value N
Glasses She poured the champagne into the glasses Fizz Y
Bowl The sportsman’s bowl won the game Measure N
Button Although he was told not to, Fred pushed the button Disobey Y
Match The derby was certainly going to be an exciting match Rivals Y
Speaker Dan connected his iPhone to the speaker Music Y
Chest The large wooden chest was covered in dust Dirty Y
Strike A policy amendment led to a strike across the profession Union Y
Coach Lee was the most respected coach in the business Add N
Change The cashier had given the customer the wrong change Supermarket Y
Band Everyone in the group wore a band Sky N
Cabinet The ministry advised the cabinet on policy alterations Politicians Y
Sign After giving her name and the date, she had to sign the contract Legal Y
Letter The little girl sounded the word out one letter at a time Stamp N
Key The musician had altered the song’s key several times Behave N
Palm The start of the private beach was indicated with a palm Bite N
Fence He wanted to learn how to fence Sport Y
 Item was removed from Word Association analysis.
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Table 5
Experimental and Filler Words, Sentences, and Probe Words Added to the Experiment 2 Semantic Relatedness Priming Task
Item Sentence Probe Related Type
Bank The old man had a long way to swim as he headed for the bank. Horoscope N Experimental
Log They were surprised how well written the old log was. Berry N Experimental
Mole The woman knew that in one of the embassies there was a mole. Traitor Y Experimental
Nut The boy wasn’t paying any attention to the bolt when the nut fell off of it. Require N Experimental
Plant The article reported that it had been very difficult to build the plant. Industry Y Experimental
Ace The man knew that to win the tennis, it might be enough to get one more ace. Cash N Ambiguous Filler
Article Dan found that most were broken when looking over all the articles. Items Y Ambiguous Filler
Bail Joe was pleased that it was not too difficult to pay the bail. Jail Y Ambiguous Filler
Blew The birthday girl blew out the candles. Cake Y Ambiguous Filler
Bow The girl tied a bow around her ponytail. Daily N Ambiguous Filler
Branch Because it was too busy, the young woman couldn’t use that branch. Soldiers N Ambiguous Filler
Break The vase was wrapped so that it wouldn’t break. Protected Y Ambiguous Filler
Bug The prisoner was silent because he knew that there were bugs in the room. Surveillance Y Ambiguous Filler
China She bought a new set of china for the tea party. Porcelain Y Ambiguous Filler
Clip The woman discovered that the dubbing was very bad in the old clip. Choice N Ambiguous Filler
Coat The man hoped that it would not take long to paint the new coat. Layer Y Ambiguous Filler
Court The couple realized that they’d brought the wrong trainers on the way to the court. Gym Y Ambiguous Filler
Crane The boys by the river watched the injured crane. Soap N Ambiguous Filler
Deed John wondered whether it had been forged as he thought about the deed. Ribbon N Ambiguous Filler
Dock The man was kept waiting by the magistrate, even though he was already at the dock. Prisoner Y Ambiguous Filler
Drawer She kept her gloves and scarves in the drawer. Town N Ambiguous Filler
Drill The students thought there was too much marching involved when they tried the drill. Thief N Ambiguous Filler
File The girl recalled that, because it was blunt, the file needed to be replaced. Antenna N Ambiguous Filler
Flour The woman took the dough and carefully put in the flour she had bought. Sieve Y Ambiguous Filler
Gag In order to make it funnier the man altered the gag. Joke Y Ambiguous Filler
Grain The buyer had hoped to find timber with a better quality grain. Forecast N Ambiguous Filler
Gum The boy could feel his new tooth coming through his gum. Fade N Ambiguous Filler
Hare The fox tried to chase the hare. Rabbit Y Ambiguous Filler
Isle There was not room for many harbors on the isle because it was so small. Video N Ambiguous Filler
Knight The armor was shiny after the knight polished it. Clean Y Ambiguous Filler
Leek As he cooked, his grandfather joked that this was the biggest ever leek. Onion Y Ambiguous Filler
Lobby The plans could mean a lot more power for the new lobby. Campaign Y Ambiguous Filler
Male The researcher thought that it was quite difficult to capture the male. Gender Y Ambiguous Filler
Mint The man thought that it would be quite easy to run the mint. Coin Y Ambiguous Filler
Model The designer thought that he had constructed the best ever model. Tissue N Ambiguous Filler
Pair Since the heel was broken, she bought a new pair of shoes. Book N Ambiguous Filler
Panel There was a temporary wooden panel separating the two rooms. Truck N Ambiguous Filler
Passage Bob was relieved that learning the passage had been so easy. Text Y Ambiguous Filler
Poker Clare knew that, among collectors, this type of poker was very popular. Politics N Ambiguous Filler
Port The man said that he would like to visit this port. Ship Y Ambiguous Filler
Post The girl wanted to ask when they would advertise the post. Employment Y Ambiguous Filler
Program Tom found several viruses when he looked at the program. Software Y Ambiguous Filler
Race Her reply showed a lack of prejudice when told about her colleague’s race. Ethnic Y Ambiguous Filler
Racket At lunch time the school children made such a racket. Elegant N Ambiguous Filler
Record Today was the hottest day on record. Job N Ambiguous Filler
Ruler The man hoped that there would be a lot more compassion from the new ruler. Hollywood N Ambiguous Filler
Sage The woman commented that it had not been very easy to consult the sage. Wise Y Ambiguous Filler
Scoop The woman thought that it would be quite a challenge to write such a big scoop. Doctor N Ambiguous Filler
See He sat up straight but still couldn’t see. Warm N Ambiguous Filler
Sentence The old man commented that it was rather harsh after hearing the sentence. Verdict Y Ambiguous Filler
Son The mother made a packed lunch for her son. Income N Ambiguous Filler
Star A picture and lots of gossip were included in the article on the star. Sound N Ambiguous Filler
State The woman described it as very sad, the state her friend lived in. Camp N Ambiguous Filler
Storey She decided to stop climbing, as she couldn’t manage the third storey. Building Y Ambiguous Filler
Strain The report said it was a contagious strain he was suffering from. Germs Y Ambiguous Filler
Volume The man explained why he was not going to publish that volume. Youth N Ambiguous Filler
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Table 5 (continued)
Item Sentence Probe Related Type
Whine Kate complained about the deafening whine in the other room. Tile N Ambiguous Filler
Bread The loaf of bread was still warm. Bake Y Low-ambiguity filler
Brick Sally inspected the bricks and noticed some of them were wet. Gamble N Low-ambiguity filler
Cage An animal cage needs to be cleaned once a week. Candle N Low-ambiguity filler
Desk When she had finished her coffee, she returned to her desk. Mug Y Low-ambiguity filler
Elm The blossoms of the elm tree were beautiful. Shade Y Low-ambiguity filler
Fabric The new fabric felt smooth against his skin. Bury N Low-ambiguity filler
Flag The flag on the embassy had been vandalized. Nation Y Low-ambiguity filler
Frog A frog jumped out from underneath the bush. Scissors N Low-ambiguity filler
Guess Everyone had to guess who the culprit was. Barrier N Low-ambiguity filler
Hill Alice rolled down the hill in the garden. Outside Y Low-ambiguity filler
Hotel There weren’t any spare rooms at the hotel. Vacancy Y Low-ambiguity filler
Juice Orange juice was served in the cafeteria every day. Food Y Low-ambiguity filler
Kitchen The kitchen had recently been refurbished. Entertainment N Low-ambiguity filler
Lunch The girls went to lunch together on a daily basis. Social Y Low-ambiguity filler
Meadow The house has a view of the meadow. Chisel N Low-ambiguity filler
Nest The boys had discovered an ant’s nest on the patio. Insect Y Low-ambiguity filler
Pond A fish swam to the edge of the pond. Fin Y Low-ambiguity filler
Request The employee’s request for better pay was not met. Education N Low-ambiguity filler
Scarf She chose a scarf to go with her outfit. Pages N Low-ambiguity filler
Snow An inch of snow had fallen in half an hour. Boat N Low-ambiguity filler
Sugar The cake was topped with icing sugar. Agency N Low-ambiguity filler
Tractor The tractor was in need of a good scrub. Wash Y Low-ambiguity filler
Turf The new turf didn’t survive the frost. Lawn Y Low-ambiguity filler
Vote People aged eighteen and over were allowed to vote. Vegetable N Low-ambiguity filler
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Table 6
Targets Words, Probe Words, Relatedness, and Item Types Used in the Experiment 2 Semantic Relatedness Test Task
Target Probe Related Item type
appendix INDEX Y Experimental
ball DANCE Y Experimental
band LOOP Y Experimental
bank RIVER Y Experimental
bar ROD Y Experimental
bark TREE Y Experimental
bat FLY Y Experimental
bed GARDEN Y Experimental
bonnet HAT Y Experimental
bowl THROW Y Experimental
box GLOVE Y Experimental
bulb LAMP Y Experimental
button PRESS Y Experimental
cabinet GOVERNMENT Y Experimental
calf LEG Y Experimental
cap LIMIT Y Experimental
card BIRTHDAY Y Experimental
case TRIAL Y Experimental
change COINS Y Experimental
chest STORAGE Y Experimental
coach TRAINER Y Experimental
cold VIRUS Y Experimental
craft VESSEL Y Experimental
cricket GRASSHOPPER Y Experimental
cross ANGRY Y Experimental
cup TROPHY Y Experimental
deck DEAL Y Experimental
fan SUPPORTER Y Experimental
fence SWORD Y Experimental
figure NUMBER Y Experimental
gear KIT Y Experimental
glasses WINE Y Experimental
hand TIME Y Experimental
interest BANKING Y Experimental
iron STEEL Y Experimental
issue EDITION Y Experimental
jam TRAFFIC Y Experimental
joint DRUG Y Experimental
key TUNE Y Experimental
lace SHOES Y Experimental
landing STAIRS Y Experimental
letter ALPHABET Y Experimental
log JOURNAL Y Experimental
mark GRADE Y Experimental
match GAME Y Experimental
mole SPY Y Experimental
mould SCULPT Y Experimental
mouse KEYBOARD Y Experimental
nail FINGER Y Experimental
note SONG Y Experimental
nut SPANNER Y Experimental
organ MUSIC Y Experimental
palm TROPICAL Y Experimental
park VEHICLE Y Experimental
pen ENCLOSURE Y Experimental
pipe TOBACCO Y Experimental
plant FACTORY Y Experimental
plug DRAIN Y Experimental
punch DRINK Y Experimental
pupil STUDENT Y Experimental
ring PHONE Y Experimental
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Table 6 (continued)
Target Probe Related Item type
sign NAME Y Experimental
sink BATHROOM Y Experimental
skip RUBBISH Y Experimental
spade DIAMONDS Y Experimental
speaker EQUIPMENT Y Experimental
spring COIL Y Experimental
staff POLE Y Experimental
step STRIDE Y Experimental
stitch CRAMP Y Experimental
straw HAY Y Experimental
strike UNION Y Experimental
temple FOREHEAD Y Experimental
toast SPEECH Y Experimental
trailer MOVIE Y Experimental
trunk SUITCASE Y Experimental
watch OBSERVE Y Experimental
wave GREET Y Experimental
ace FASHION N Ambiguous Filler
article SERGEANT N Ambiguous Filler
bail OPINION N Ambiguous Filler
blew CALENDAR N Ambiguous Filler
bow EAR N Ambiguous Filler
branch SALT N Ambiguous Filler
break KINGDOM N Ambiguous Filler
bug FAMILY N Ambiguous Filler
china ROAST N Ambiguous Filler
clip UNIVERSITY N Ambiguous Filler
coat WIN N Ambiguous Filler
court BIOLOGY N Ambiguous Filler
crane MAGAZINE N Ambiguous Filler
deed LOUD N Ambiguous Filler
dock STAMP N Ambiguous Filler
drawer FAR N Ambiguous Filler
drill LEAFLET N Ambiguous Filler
file CAPTIVE N Ambiguous Filler
flour THREAD N Ambiguous Filler
gag TORCH N Ambiguous Filler
grain COLONEL N Ambiguous Filler
gum WHIP N Ambiguous Filler
hare BENCH N Ambiguous Filler
isle SPOON N Ambiguous Filler
knight NEWSPAPER N Ambiguous Filler
leek STAGE N Ambiguous Filler
lobby GRIEF N Ambiguous Filler
male SUPPER N Ambiguous Filler
mint OCEAN N Ambiguous Filler
model NORTH N Ambiguous Filler
pair CHALK N Ambiguous Filler
panel KITTEN N Ambiguous Filler
passage TEA N Ambiguous Filler
poker DOCUMENT N Ambiguous Filler
port TOES N Ambiguous Filler
post LEAF N Ambiguous Filler
program FORK N Ambiguous Filler
race BIG N Ambiguous Filler
racket QUEST N Ambiguous Filler
record WEAK N Ambiguous Filler
ruler CLOUD N Ambiguous Filler
sage CELEBRATION N Ambiguous Filler
scoop VAN N Ambiguous Filler
see PLOUGH N Ambiguous Filler
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Table 6 (continued)
Target Probe Related Item type
sentence FROGS N Ambiguous Filler
son WHISTLE N Ambiguous Filler
star LEATHER N Ambiguous Filler
state BEER N Ambiguous Filler
storey FEAST N Ambiguous Filler
strain FIRE N Ambiguous Filler
volume CACTUS N Ambiguous Filler
whine CLOTHING N Ambiguous Filler
arms GOAT N Ambiguous Filler (Unprimed)
ash RUDE N Ambiguous Filler (Unprimed)
boxer POTATO N Ambiguous Filler (Unprimed)
bridge CRY N Ambiguous Filler (Unprimed)
cell PENCIL N Ambiguous Filler (Unprimed)
cheek LEASE N Ambiguous Filler (Unprimed)
fete DOG N Ambiguous Filler (Unprimed)
flair ROOM N Ambiguous Filler (Unprimed)
fowl ENGINE N Ambiguous Filler (Unprimed)
glare TEAM N Ambiguous Filler (Unprimed)
head HOLIDAY N Ambiguous Filler (Unprimed)
march PICTURE N Ambiguous Filler (Unprimed)
mine BANANA N Ambiguous Filler (Unprimed)
mousse PRESSURE N Ambiguous Filler (Unprimed)
nugget CARTOON N Ambiguous Filler (Unprimed)
ore CHART N Ambiguous Filler (Unprimed)
poll BEE N Ambiguous Filler (Unprimed)
prophet CHILDREN N Ambiguous Filler (Unprimed)
reign SUPERMARKET N Ambiguous Filler (Unprimed)
root PILL N Ambiguous Filler (Unprimed)
shell TEACHER N Ambiguous Filler (Unprimed)
sore RICE N Ambiguous Filler (Unprimed)
stork NOTEBOOK N Ambiguous Filler (Unprimed)
table HEALTH N Ambiguous Filler (Unprimed)
tick MARRIAGE N Ambiguous Filler (Unprimed)
wait FRIEND N Ambiguous Filler (Unprimed)
bread WHEAT Y Low-Ambiguity Filler
brick CEMENT Y Low-Ambiguity Filler
cage SHADY N Low-Ambiguity Filler
desk WORK Y Low-Ambiguity Filler
elm STRING N Low-Ambiguity Filler
fabric SOFT Y Low-Ambiguity Filler
flag COUNTRY Y Low-Ambiguity Filler
frog HOP Y Low-Ambiguity Filler
guess NECK N Low-Ambiguity Filler
hill CHIN N Low-Ambiguity Filler
hotel SLEEP Y Low-Ambiguity Filler
juice WAR N Low-Ambiguity Filler
kitchen STOVE Y Low-Ambiguity Filler
lunch MEAL Y Low-Ambiguity Filler
meadow GRASS Y Low-Ambiguity Filler
nest WRITE N Low-Ambiguity Filler
pond WATER Y Low-Ambiguity Filler
request ANIMAL N Low-Ambiguity Filler
scarf REST N Low-Ambiguity Filler
snow MAGNET N Low-Ambiguity Filler
sugar WRIST N Low-Ambiguity Filler
tractor STAPLE N Low-Ambiguity Filler
turf BRIGHT N Low-Ambiguity Filler
vote BALLOT Y Low-Ambiguity Filler
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